Biobjective Robust Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowdsensing

作     者：Xu, Jia Zhou, Yuanhang Ding, Yuqing Yang, Dejun Xu, Lijie 

作者机构：Nanjing Univ Posts & Telecommun Jiangsu Key Lab Big Data Secur & Intelligent Proc Nanjing 210023 Peoples R China Colorado Sch Mines Dept Comp Sci Golden CO 80401 USA 

出 版 物：《IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL》 (IEEE Internet Things J.)

年 卷 期：2021年第8卷第19期

页      面：14971-14984页

核心收录：

学科分类：0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：NSFC [61872193, 61872191, 62072254] NSF STITP grants of NJUPT [SYB2019053] 

主　　题：Crowdsensing Sensors Task analysis Robustness Linear programming Optimization Smart phones Biobjective problem incentive mechanism mobile crowdsensing robustness 

摘      要：In recent years, mobile crowdsensing has become an effective method for large-scale data collection. Incentive mechanism is fundamentally important for mobile crowdsensing systems. Many mobile crowdsensing systems expect to optimize multiple objectives simultaneously. Most of the existing works transform the multiobjective problem into a single objective problem through constraints or scalarization method. However, due to the uncertain importance (weights) of objectives and the instable quality of crowdsensed data, such transformation is usually unrealizable. In this article, we aim to optimize the worst performance of two objective functions in mobile crowdsensing in order to improve the system robustness. We model an auction-based biobjective robust mobile crowdsensing system, and design two independent objective functions to maximize the expected profit and coverage, respectively. We formulate the robust user selection (RUS) problem, and design an incentive mechanism, which utilizes the combination of binary search and greedy algorithm, to solve the RUS problem. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the designed incentive mechanisms satisfy desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and constant approximation to the tightened RUS problem. Moreover, the proposed incentive mechanism can be easily extended to multiobjective robust mobile crowdsensing systems, and all desirable properties still hold. The simulation results reveal that our incentive mechanism achieves 11% improvement of the platform s utility, compared with the greedy algorithm for biobjective mobile crowdsensing systems on average.