A Cost-Sharing Scheme for the k-Level Facility Location Game with Penalties

作     者：Feng-Min Wang Jia-Jia Wang Na Li Yan-Jun Jiang Shi-Cheng Li 

作者机构：Beijing Jinghang Research Institute of Computing and CommunicationBeijing 100074China School of Mathematics and Statistics ScienceLudong UniversityYantai 264025ShandongChina The Classified Information Carrier Safety Management Engineering Technology Research Center of BeijingBeijing 100074China 

出 版 物：《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》 (中国运筹学会会刊（英文）)

年 卷 期：2022年第10卷第1期

页      面：173-182页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.11901544 and 11801251) 

主　　题：Cost-sharing scheme Cross-monotonic Competitive k-level facility location game 

摘      要：In the k-level facility location problem with penalties,each client will be either serviced or rejected *** if the client is planned to be serviced,then it must be connected to a sequence of k different kinds of facilities located in k levels of *** total cost including the facility cost,connection cost and penalty cost will be jointly paid by all the *** the corresponding game of the k-level facility location problem with penalties,called the k-level facility location game with penalties,the total cost should be allocated to different *** work set out a cost-sharing scheme for the k-level facility location game with penalties that is cross-monotonic,competitive,and the approximate cost recovery is 6.