Accommodating Strategic Players in Distributed Algorithms for Power Dispatch Problems

作     者：Chen, Sijie Xu, Chengke Yan, Zheng Guan, Xinping Le, Xinyi 

作者机构：Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ Key Lab Control Power Transmiss & Convers Minist Educ Shanghai 200240 Peoples R China Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ Sch Elect Informat & Elect Engn Key Lab Syst Control & Informat Proc Dept AutomatMinist Educ China Shanghai 200240 Peoples R China Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ Shanghai Engn Res Ctr Intelligent Control & Manag Shanghai 200240 Peoples R China 

出 版 物：《IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS》 (IEEE Trans. Cybern.)

年 卷 期：2022年第52卷第11期

页      面：12594-12603页

核心收录：

学科分类：0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：National Natural Science Foundation of China 

主　　题：Games Nash equilibrium Distributed algorithms Cost function Convergence Analytical models Time-domain analysis Distributed algorithm game theory Nash equilibrium neurodynamic optimization strategic bidding 

摘      要：Distributed algorithms are gaining increasing research interests in the area of power system optimization and dispatch. Existing distributed power dispatch algorithms (DPDAs) usually assume that suppliers/consumers bid truthfully. However, this article shows the need for DPDAs to consider strategic players and to take account of their behavior deviation from what the DPDAs expect. To address this, we propose a distributed strategy update algorithm (DSUA) on top of a DPDA. The DSUA considers strategic suppliers who optimize their bids in a DPDA, using only the information accessible from a DPDA, that is, price. The DSUA also considers the cases when suppliers update bids alternately or simultaneously. Under both cases, we show the closeness of supplier bids to the Nash equilibrium via game-theoretic analysis as well as simulation.