版权所有:内蒙古大学图书馆 技术提供:维普资讯• 智图
内蒙古自治区呼和浩特市赛罕区大学西街235号 邮编: 010021
作者机构:Iran Univ Sci & Technol Ctr Excellence Power Syst Automat & Operat Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran Iran Univ Sci & Technol Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran Iran Univ Sci & Technol Fac Ind Engn Tehran Iran Lappeenranta Lahti Univ Technol LUT Sch Energy Syst Lappeenranta Finland Shiraz Univ Technol Dept Elect & Elect Engn Shiraz Iran Univ Vaasa Sch Technol & Innovat Vaasa 65200 Finland Univ Porto Fac Engn P-4200465 Porto Portugal INESC TEC P-4200465 Porto Portugal
出 版 物:《ENERGY》 (能源杂志)
年 卷 期:2021年第234卷
页 面:121239-121239页
核心收录:
学科分类:0820[工学-石油与天然气工程] 08[工学] 0807[工学-动力工程及工程热物理]
基 金:FEDER funds through COMPETE 2020 Portuguese funds through FCT [POCI-01-0145-FEDER-029803 (02/SAICT/2017)]
主 题:Retail energy market Demand response Mixed-integer linear programming Energy hub Combined heat and power
摘 要:The present research aims to formulate competition in a retail energy market in the presence of an Integrated Demand Response (IDR) program to reduce prosumer costs and increase retailer profits. This gives prosumers more degrees of freedom to reduce their energy costs. The retail energy market includes retailers and prosumers equipped with an energy hub containing a boiler for producing heat and combined heat and power (CHP). Retailers aim to maximize profit, whereas prosumers seek to minimize their costs. Hence, a multi-leader-follower game with a bi-level program emerges in which the upper level deals with the profit maximization of each retailer while the lower level considers the cost minimization of each prosumer. The strategic behaviour of each retailer is modelled as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) problem. Simultaneously solving all MPECs, which leads to an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), determines the market equilibrium point. The equilibrium point is achieved using mathematical, analytical methods and linearization of nonlinear constraints by accurate techniques. Two different case studies are developed to investigate how the number of retailers influences the market equilibrium point. The first case includes two retailers, while the second case considers an increase in the number of retailers. The results demonstrate that with an increase in retailers number, their competition increases, causing the prosumers costs to reduce. Furthermore, our results suggest the IDR impact on reduced prosumers cost and increased retailers profit. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.