An Integrated Data Envelopment Analysis and Non-Cooperative Game Approach for Public Transportation Incentive Subsidy Allocation

作     者：Xie, Qiwei Wu, Xiao Dai, Qianzhi Zheng, Xiaolong Wang, Fei-Yue 

作者机构：Beijing Univ Technol Res Base Beijing Modern Mfg Dev Beijing 100124 Peoples R China Hubei Univ Fac Math & Stat Wuhan 430062 Peoples R China Hefei Univ Technol Sch Econ Hefei 230009 Peoples R China Chinese Acad Sci State Key Lab Management & Control Complex Syst Inst Automat Beijing 100190 Peoples R China Univ Chinese Acad Sci Sch Artificial Intelligence Beijing 100190 Peoples R China 

出 版 物：《IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS》 (IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.)

年 卷 期：2022年第23卷第11期

页      面：21515-21530页

核心收录：

学科分类：0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学] 0814[工学-土木工程] 0823[工学-交通运输工程] 

基　　金：National Natural Science Foundation of China [61673381, 71701060, 72171072] Natural Science Foundation of Beijing Municipality State Key Laboratory of Management and Control for Complex Systems, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences Ministry of Science and Technology of China [2020AAA0108401, 2019QY(Y)0101] 

主　　题：Resource management Costs Government Games Industries Behavioral sciences Data envelopment analysis Subsidy allocation data envelopment analysis information asymmetry Nash non-cooperative game 

摘      要：As an important national initiative, China s public transport priority development strategy is conducive to the development of the public transport industry and urban economic construction. However, current public transport operation is inefficient due to the information asymmetry between the government and public transport enterprises, thereby inevitably generating losses. To address the issue of information asymmetry, this study designs a public transport subsidy allocation method from the perspective of incentives and discusses the allocation results using this method through a case study. The rationality of the proposed method and the scientificity and authenticity of the conclusions, are fully explained and demonstrated via the experimental simulation. Based on real published data of public transport enterprises, the proposed method can motivate public transport enterprises to improve their performance. In the case of reporting false data, the proposed method can motivate public transport enterprises to report accurate data.