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内蒙古自治区呼和浩特市赛罕区大学西街235号 邮编: 010021
作者机构:Yantai Univ Sch Math & Informat Sci Yantai 264005 Peoples R China Dalian Univ Technol Key Lab Intelligent Control & Optimizat Ind Equip Minist Educ Dalian 116024 Peoples R China Nanjing Univ Sci & Technol Sch Automat Nanjing 210094 Peoples R China Dalian Univ Technol Key Lab Adv Technol Aerosp Vehicles Dalian 116024 Liaoning Peoples R China Dalian Univ Technol Sch Aeronaut & Astronaut Dalian 116024 Liaoning Peoples R China
出 版 物:《IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING》 (IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng.)
年 卷 期:2022年第9卷第6期
页 面:4287-4296页
核心收录:
学科分类:0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学] 0701[理学-数学]
基 金:National Natural Science Foundation of China [62173181, 61803324, 61773086, 62222308] FundamentalResearch Funds for the CentralUniversities Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province [BK20220139] Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship Program by CAST [2021QNRC001]
主 题:Heuristic algorithms Games Vehicle dynamics Topology Eigenvalues and eigenfunctions Distributed algorithms Cost function Nash equilibrium Disturbance rejection distributed robust switched algorithm hybrid systems Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking network attacks
摘 要:This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem of the game in which the dynamics of all players are affected by external disturbances and the communication network among players may be influenced by persistent attacks. To solve this problem, a distributed robust switched algorithm is proposed. This distributed switched strategy consists of two modules: One is the internal-model based dynamics that can be used to compensate the effects caused by external disturbances;the other is gradient-based optimization module which can utilize the local information to estimate the players decisions and dynamically seek the optimal solution. By utilizing average dwell-time and time-ratio constraints to characterize the network attacks, the proposed switched strategy is modeled into a hybrid dynamical system. Moreover, employing the hybrid systems approach, we prove that the decisions of all players can exponentially converge to the NE of the considered game. Finally, an example is provided to illustrate the theoretical results.