Bilateral Planning and Operation for Integrated Energy Service Provider and Prosumers-A Nash Bargaining-Based Method

作     者：Jiang, Qian Jia, Hongjie Mu, Yunfei Yu, Xiaodan Wang, Zibo 

作者机构：Key Laboratory of Smart Grid Ministry of Education Tianjin University Tianjin300072 China China Electric Power Research Institute Haidian District Beijing100192 China Department of Electrical Automation and Information Engineering 

出 版 物：《SSRN》 

年 卷 期：2024年

核心收录：

主　　题：Numerical methods 

摘      要：Integrated community energy systems (ICESs) facilitate stakeholders to collaboratively create profit by planning and operating energy devices, including generation, conversion, and storage systems. However, the coupling and complementarity of multiple energy carriers, along with the comprehensive interaction among independent stakeholders, pose significant challenges in ICES planning and operating. These challenges necessitate balancing overall economic efficiency with individual stakeholder interests. This study investigates the economic interaction between the integrated energy service provider (IESP) and the photovoltaic energy prosumers (EPs) in ICES from a cooperative perspective, focusing on both planning and operating stage. A bilateral planning and operation method for the IESP and the EPs based on Nash bargaining theory is proposed in this paper. The proposed method establishes a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the IESP and EPs, instead of a hierarchical paradigm. This study also presents an analysis of the relationship between the Nash bargaining problem and the social welfare maximization problem, demonstrating that solving the Nash bargaining problem can lead to a social welfare optimum. Additionally, an accelerated privacy-preserving distributed algorithm, in comparison to the central approach, is designed to solve the Nash bargaining problem. Numerical studies based on realistic data reveal that the Nash bargaining-based planning and operation method provides more benefits for both the IESP and EPs, as compared to the non-cooperation game method. © 2024, The Authors. All rights reserved.