Learning-Allocation Dynamics in Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility ⁎

作     者：A. Khaleghi D. Bauso T. Namerikawa 

作者机构：Jan C. Willems Center for Systems and Control ENTEG Faculty of Science and Engineering University of Groningen Groningen 9747 AG The Netherlands Jan C. Willems Center for Systems and Control ENTEG Faculty of Science and Engineering University of Groningen Groningen 9747 AG The Netherlands and also Dipartimento di Ingegneria Università di Palermo Palermo 90128 Italy Department of System Design Engineering Keio University 3-14-1 Hiyoshi Kohoku-ku Yokohama Kanagawa 223-8522 Japan 

出 版 物：《IFAC-PapersOnLine》 

年 卷 期：2024年第58卷第30期

页      面：31-36页

主　　题：Coalitional games game theory gradient dynamics wind energy aggregation 

摘      要：We consider a set of players who have to make a joint decision under uncertainty and learn via gradient dynamics how to reach the maximal profit for the coalition while the game is running and the revenue gets allocated to the players. The main result is the convergence of the intertwined learning-allocation dynamics to a stable solution which yields the maximal profit for the coalition and a stable allocation in the core of the asymptotic game.