Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games under ambiguity

作     者：Liu, Hailin Xiong, Wei 

作者机构：Sun Yat Sen Univ Dept Philosophy Inst Log & Cognit Guangzhou Guangdong Peoples R China 

出 版 物：《INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPROXIMATE REASONING》 (国际近似理论杂志)

年 卷 期：2016年第76卷第0期

页      面：63-79页

核心收录：

学科分类：07[理学] 0701[理学-数学] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 070101[理学-基础数学] 

基　　金：Major Project of Key Research Institute of Chinese Ministry of Education [14JJD720001] 

主　　题：Dynamic consistency Incomplete information games Ambiguity Gamma-maximin Rectangularity 

摘      要：We develop a general framework of incomplete information games under ambiguity which extends the traditional framework of Bayesian games to the context of Ellsberg-type ambiguity. We then propose new solution concepts called ex ante and interim Gamma-maximin equilibrium for solving such games. We show that, unlike the standard notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, these concepts may lead to rather different recommendations for the same game under ambiguity. This phenomenon is often referred to as dynamic inconsistency. Moreover, we characterize the sufficient condition under which dynamic consistency is assured in this generalized framework. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.