ON IMMUNITY AGAINST BIHAM AND SHAMIR DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS

作     者：ADAMS, CM 

作者机构：Bell-Northern Res. Ltd. P.O. Box 3511 Stn. C Ottawa Ont. K1Y 4H7 Canada 

出 版 物：《INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS》 (信息处理快报)

年 卷 期：1992年第41卷第2期

页      面：77-80页

核心收录：

学科分类：08[工学] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

主　　题：DESIGN OF ALGORITHMS CRYPTANALYSIS SUBSTITUTION BOXES DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD DESIGN OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS 

摘      要：Recently, Biham and Shamir described differential cryptanalysis: a cryptanalytic attack which can break the Data Encryption Standard (DES) with up to eight rounds in a few minutes on a PC and can break DES with up to 15 rounds faster than an exhaustive search. In this note we show that not only DES-like systems, but substitution-permutation network (SPN) cryptosystems in general which are constructed around bent function based substitution boxes (s-boxes) will be immune to Biham and Shamir s attack.