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作者机构:Tech Univ Berlin Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci D-10623 Berlin Germany Univ Oxford Dept Engn Sci Oxford OX1 2JD England Univ Calif Los Angeles Dept Elect Engn Los Angeles CA 90095 USA
出 版 物:《IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COGNITIVE COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING》 (IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw.)
年 卷 期:2019年第5卷第1期
页 面:165-180页
核心收录:
学科分类:0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学]
基 金:Office of Naval Research (ONR) NSF [ECCS 1462245, CCF 1533983]
主 题:Cyber-physical systems distributed task allocation stochastic cooperative games uncertainty
摘 要:We consider the problem of task allocation in a network of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The network can have different states, and the tasks are of different types. The task arrival is stochastic and state-dependent. Every CPS is capable of performing each type of task with some specific state-dependent efficiency. The CPSs have to agree on task allocation prior to knowing about the realized network s state and/or the arrived tasks. We model the problem as a multi-state stochastic cooperative game with state uncertainty. We then use the concept of deterministic equivalence and sequential core to solve the problem. We establish the non-emptiness of the strong sequential core in our designed task allocation game and investigate its characteristics including uniqueness and optimality. Moreover, we prove that in the task allocation game, the strong sequential core is equivalent to Walrasian equilibrium under state uncertainty;consequently, it can be implemented by using the Walras tatonnement process.