Onion routing circuit construction via latency graphs

作     者：Castillo-Perez, Sergio Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin 

作者机构：Autonomous Univ Barcelona Dept Informat & Commun Engn E-08193 Barcelona Spain CNRS Samovar UMR 5157 TELECOM SudParis Inst MINES TELECOM Evry France 

出 版 物：《COMPUTERS & SECURITY》 (Comput Secur)

年 卷 期：2013年第37卷

页      面：197-214页

核心收录：

学科分类：08[工学] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [TSI2007-65406-C03-03 E-AEGIS  TIN2011-27076-C03-02 CO-PRIVACY  TIN2010-15764 N-KHRONOUS  CSD2007-0004 ARES] 

主　　题：Onion routing Anonymity Privacy Entropy Graphs Algorithmics 

摘      要：The use of anonymity-based infrastructures and anonymisers is a plausible solution to mitigate privacy problems on the Internet. Tor (short for The onion router) is a popular low-latency anonymity system that can be installed as an end-user application on a wide range of operating systems to redirect the traffic through a series of anonymising proxy circuits. The construction of these circuits determines both the latency and the anonymity degree of the Tor anonymity system. While some circuit construction strategies lead to delays which are tolerated for activities like Web browsing, they can make the system vulnerable to linking attacks. We evaluate in this paper three classical strategies for the construction of Tor circuits, with respect to their de-anonymisation risk and latency performance. We then develop a new circuit selection algorithm that considerably reduces the success probability of linking attacks while keeping a good degree of performance. We finally conduct experiments on a real-world Tor deployment over Planet Lab. Our experimental results confirm the validity of our strategy and its performance increase for Web browsing. (c) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.