Game-Theoretic Protection Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers

作     者：Hota, Ashish R. Sundaram, Shreyas 

作者机构：Automatic Control Laboratory ETH Zurich Switzerland School of Electrical and Computer Engineering Purdue University United States 

出 版 物：《IFAC-PapersOnLine》 

年 卷 期：2019年第51卷第34期

页      面：145-150页

核心收录：

基　　金：Decisio∗ n-Makers ∗∗ Ashish R. Hota∗ Shreyas Sundaram∗∗ AshishR.Hota ∗ Shreyas Sundaram ∗∗ ∗ Ashish R. Hota∗ Shreyas Sundaram∗∗ ∗Automatic Control Laboratory  ETH fiuricff  Switzerland (Email: ∗Automatic Control Laboratory  ETH fiuricff  Switzerland (Email: Automatic ControlaLffaobtoar@actoonrytr oEl.TeeH.etffifuzr.cicfff)f.  Switzerland (Email: ∗∗∗ affota@control.ee.etffz.cff). ∗∗ SAcufftoooml oaftiEc lCecotnritcraollaaLffnaodbtoaCr@aoctmoonrpytur toeElr.TeeEH.netgffiifunzr.eciecfrff)if. ngS wPituzerdrluaendUn(Eivmerasiilt:y  ∗∗Scffool of Electrical and Computer Engineering  Purdue University  Scffool of ElectUriScAala(afEfnomdtaaC@ilo:cmosnuptnurdtoealr.reaeE2.ne@tgfpifnzu.ercedfrfu)ie.n.ge duP)urdue University  ∗∗Scffool of ElectUSAUriScAal((aEmEnmdaiaCillo::mssunupnuddteaarrraaE22n@@gpupinuerreddruuie.en.gee dduuP))urdue University  USA (Email: sundara2@purdue.edu) Abstract: We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how Abstract: We study networks of huumman decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by Asotubpdsriteorstaecicnt: tbhWeehmeavssieotluvraedlsy eacngoeantinwosmotrikcSssussochfeopwhtuiibnmlgea-nItnhfadetecctheisduio-mSnau-nmscsaekppeterirbscleewiv(heSoIpSir)nodbepeapibdeielnimtdieeicnsst.liynMadoeticnvioadnteelidnheobawyr studies in behavviiooral economics showing that huummans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear fashion we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies. sIantushodiuioernsseiwntteibneexgha amnvoiinodereastlhcehecoimonspoeamcthticsesiorfscshuuorcwihningmgrisatptheeasrtcteohputmimoinnasinmosnizpetehrtecheeeiqviueniflepibcrtroiibouanmbpiplrirtooibetasebcitinliiotnya suntnroadnteleirgniteehaser. In our setting nodes chhooose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the Idanesghoriueoren-sbewatsteeindexgma mneaoinnde-efsitehcldehoiamopsppearocthxtsiemiorfacstuuiorcnihnogmf ritsahpteesrScIteSopetmipoiinndsiemoniizcethptelhuesqtiunhifeleibctroiisoutnmopfprtrohobetaierbcstileiioltenycstutenrdadtceeurgritienhsge. degree-based mean-field approxxiimmation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing drnaetgoer.uereW-sbeatestesintdagmb lneisaohnd-etfhsieecldheoxaoipspteernothxceiemiroafctuiaornidneoggfrrteaheteebsSaItsSoedempeiiqnduiemmiliiibzceriputlhmues utinhnfedecectroisobtnotpfhrtohtbreuairebsialeilnteydctunendodnceluirnrteinhager rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear dpaetgrecr.epeW-tbieoanesesstdoamfblieinsafhnec-tfthiieoelndexapiprsoptbernoaxcbeiimliotafietiason(dueongfdrteeherebsSuaIisSteadebpleeiqdauesmilsiuibcmripuplmutisonuthsn)ed.ecWrosbhtoeotnfhthtreuirepseaerln-eudcntneitdonccoluisnrteinaogrf perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of pcauetrreicn.egpWtrieaotneestisoafbsuliinfsffhieccitethnioetnleyxphirsiotgbehnacbweileiotsfiehasow(duetnghdraeetertbsruuaiseteaedbxlpeeqeacutsialsiutbimroinupmtmioinunsnim)d.eiWzrebrhsoetcnhhotthoresueepteahrne-udcnunirtoinncgolisnrteaatoerf curing rate is sufficiently high we show that true expectation minimizers chhooose the curing rate to be zero at the equilibrium while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighttiinngg. tourbinegzerraoteatistshueffeiqciueinlitblyriuhmighw whieleshcuowrintgharattteruiseneoxnpzecrtoatuinodnemr ninoinmliinzeerasr cphrooobsaebtilhiteycwueriinghgtriantge. © 2019  IFAC (International Federation of Automatic Control) Hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Game Theory Network Games SIS Epidemics Behavioral Economics P 

主　　题：Epidemiology 

摘      要：We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear fashion, we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies. In our setting, nodes choose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the degree-based mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of curing rate is sufficiently high, we show that true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate to be zero at the equilibrium, while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighting. © 2019