Opportunistic shirking behaviour during unpaid overtime

作     者：Lopez, Michael J. Mills, Brian M. 

作者机构：Dept Math & Stat Saratoga Springs NY 12866 USA Univ Florida Coll Hlth & Human Performance Dept Tourism Recreat & Sport Management Gainesville FL USA 

出 版 物：《APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS》 (应用经济学通报)

年 卷 期：2019年第26卷第7期

页      面：608-612页

核心收录：

学科分类：02[经济学] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 

主　　题：Shirking personnel economics baseball generalized additive models 

摘      要：We identify the presence of shirking by Major League Baseball umpires during indefinite unpaid overtime, as defined by extra innings. In the presence of new information about expected game length, umpires exert biases in ball and strike calls consistent with opportunistically reducing the likelihood of working additional time. General implications with respect to the effectiveness of salaried workers during unpaid overtime hours are discussed.