Best fit social choices: An alternative to arrow

作     者：Craven, J 

作者机构：UNIV KENTCANTERBURYKENTENGLAND 

出 版 物：《ECONOMIC JOURNAL》 (经济学杂志)

年 卷 期：1996年第106卷第438期

页      面：1161-1174页

核心收录：

学科分类：02[经济学] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 

主　　题：Social welfare Social choice Application programming interfaces Aggregation Ambivalence Majority voting Rational choice theory Mathematical functions Economic theory Moral judgment 

摘      要：This paper explores an approach to social choice which is an alternative to Arrow s social welfare function. We consider best fit social rankings for any individual preferences through the definition of levels of agreement between preferences and rankings. We thereby avoid the pairwise approach of Arrow s independence and Pareto conditions, and we demonstrate the possibility of non-dictatorial social choice. Mie consider the rationality implications of a non-unique outcome, and determine additional properties, including majority-consistency, of the Condorcet process for determining the rankings. The approach also allows an interpretation of Sen s impossibility of a Paretian liberal in terms of individual agreement.