Fault Attack of SMS4 Based on Internal Collisions

作     者：Renjie Zhu Qingyu Ou Fang Luo 

作者机构：Department of Information Security Naval University of Engineering Wuhan Hubei 430000 China (Science and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory) 

出 版 物：《Journal of Physics: Conference Series》 

年 卷 期：2020年第1486卷第7期

学科分类：07[理学] 0702[理学-物理学] 

摘      要：A fault attack of SMS4 based on internal collision is proposed. The method assumes that the attacker can attack under the condition of selecting plaintext, and adopts the byte-oriented random fault model to successfully recover the original key by injecting the fault in the first few rounds of the encryption algorithm of the SMS4. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the 60 fault injections can successfully recover the original key of the SMS4, with a probability of over 99%. If the attacker can control the location of fault injection, then only 16 fault injections are needed to successfully recover the original key of the SMS4. In general, 30 to 40 fault injections can successfully restore the original key.