This paper maintains that for an access-control (AC) mechanism tosupport a wide range of policies, it is best to dispense with any built-insemantics for roles in the mechanism itself---be it the semantics of RBAC, ora...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581138726
This paper maintains that for an access-control (AC) mechanism tosupport a wide range of policies, it is best to dispense with any built-insemantics for roles in the mechanism itself---be it the semantics of RBAC, orany other---leaving such semantics to be defined by particular policies. Inother words, an AC mechanism should be sensitive to roles, allowingspecific policies to take roles into account for their authorizationdecisions. But it should not be based on any particular interpretationof the structure of roles, or of their effect on accesscontrol. The validity of this assertion is demonstrated by showing that a mechanismcalled Law-governed interaction (LGI), which has no built-in concept of roles,can nevertheless support a wide range of policies that take roles intoaccount. These include RBAC itself, its various generalizations, as well asconcepts like budgetary controls, which seems to be quite inconsistent withRBAC. All such policies can be formulated, deployed, and enforced, via asingle scalable, and fully implemented LGI mechanism.
Traditional network security technologies such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems usually work according to a static ruleset only. We believe that a better approach to network security can be achieved if we ...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581136814
Traditional network security technologies such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems usually work according to a static ruleset only. We believe that a better approach to network security can be achieved if we use quantified levels of risk as an input. In this paper, we describe a dynamic accesscontrol architecture which uses risk to determine whether to allow or deny access by a source connection into the network. A simulation of our architecture shows favorable and promising results.
Traditional accesscontrol mechanisms rely on a reference monitor to mediate access to protected resources. Reference monitors are inherently centralized and existing attempts to distribute the functionality of the re...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581136814
Traditional accesscontrol mechanisms rely on a reference monitor to mediate access to protected resources. Reference monitors are inherently centralized and existing attempts to distribute the functionality of the reference monitor suffer from problems of scalability. Cryptographic accesscontrol is a new distributed accesscontrol paradigm designed for a global federation of information systems. It defines an implicit accesscontrol mechanism, which relies exclusively on cryptography to provide confidentiality and integrity of data managed by the system. It is particularly designed to operate in untrusted environments where the lack of global knowledge and control are defining characteristics. The proposed mechanism has been implemented in a distributed file system, which is presented in this paper along with a preliminary evaluation of the proposed mechanism.
We investigate the cost of changing accesscontrol policies dynamically as a response action in computer network defense. We compare and contrast the use of access lists and capability lists in this regard, and develo...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581136814
We investigate the cost of changing accesscontrol policies dynamically as a response action in computer network defense. We compare and contrast the use of access lists and capability lists in this regard, and develop a quantitative feel for the performance overheads and storage requirements. We also explore the issues related to preserving safety properties and trust assumptions during this process. We suggest augmentations to policy specifications that can guarantee these properties in spite of dynamic changes to system state. Using the lessons learned from this exercise, we apply these techniques in the design of dynamic accesscontrols for dynamic environments.
Various security models have been proposed in recent years for different purposes. Each of these aims to ease administration by introducing new types of security policies and models. This increases the complexity a sy...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581136814
Various security models have been proposed in recent years for different purposes. Each of these aims to ease administration by introducing new types of security policies and models. This increases the complexity a system administrator is faced with. Ultimately, the resources expended in choosing amongst all of these models leads to less efficient administration. In this paper, we propose a new accesscontrol paradigm, which is already well established in virus and SPAM protection as partial delegation of administration to external expertise centres. Well-known vulnerabilities can be filtered out and known sources of attacks can be automatically blocked. We describe how partial outsourcing can be achieved in a secure way. A framework, which enables this process has already been developed.
Constraints in accesscontrol in general and separation of duty constraints in particular are an important area of research. There are two important issues relating to constraints: their specification and their enforc...
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Constraints in accesscontrol in general and separation of duty constraints in particular are an important area of research. There are two important issues relating to constraints: their specification and their enforcement. We believe that existing separation of duty specification schemes are rather complicated and that the few enforcement models that exist are unlikely to scale well. We examine the assumptions behind existing approaches to separation of duty and present a combined specification and implementation model for a class of constraints that includes separation of duty constraints. The specification model is set-based and has a simpler syntax than existing approaches. We discuss the enforcement of constraints and the relationship between static, dynamic and historical separation of duty constraints. Finally, we propose a model for a scalable role-based reference monitor, based on dynamic accesscontrol structures, that can be used to enforce constraints in an efficient manner.
In the health care sector, access to medical information is more and more electronically achieved. Therefore, it is very important to define security policies which restrict access to pieces of information in order to...
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In the health care sector, access to medical information is more and more electronically achieved. Therefore, it is very important to define security policies which restrict access to pieces of information in order to guarantee security properties like confidentiality or integrity properties. These security policies are not always free of conflicts, in particular in the presence of exceptional situations. This paper proposes tools for accesscontrol, based on the notion of roles, in the possibilistic logic framework. We first show how to formalize basic concepts of security policies. Then we present two approaches for dealing with conflicts based on a stratification of security policy's rules. Finally, an example of health care is presented.
Using an underlying role-based model for the administration of roles has proved itself to be a successful approach. This paper sets out to describe the enterprise role-based accesscontrol model (ERBAC) in the context...
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Using an underlying role-based model for the administration of roles has proved itself to be a successful approach. This paper sets out to describe the enterprise role-based accesscontrol model (ERBAC) in the context of SAM Jupiter, a commercial enterprise security management software. We provide an overview of the role-based conceptual model underlying SAM Jupiter. Having established this basis, we describe how the model is used to facilitate a role-based administration approach. In particular, we discuss our notion of 'scopes', which describe the objects over which an administrator has authority. The second part provides a case study based on our real-world experiences in the implementation of role-based administrative infrastructures. Finally, a critical evaluation and comparison with current approaches to administrative role-based accesscontrol is provided.
The focus of accesscontrol in client/server environments is on protecting sensitive server resources by determining whether or not a client is authorized to access those resources. The set of resources are usually st...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581136814
The focus of accesscontrol in client/server environments is on protecting sensitive server resources by determining whether or not a client is authorized to access those resources. The set of resources are usually static, and an accesscontrol policy associated with each resource specifies who is authorized to access the resource. In this paper, we turn the traditional client/server accesscontrol model on its head, and address how to protect the sensitive content that clients disclose to servers. Since client content is dynamically generated at runtime, the usual approach of associating a policy with the resource (content) a priori does not work. In this paper, we propose an accesscontrol model for protecting client-side content that is dynamically generated and disclosed at runtime. Our model identifies sensitive content, maps the sensitive content to an accesscontrol policy, and establishes the trustworthiness of the server before disclosing the sensitive content to the server. The model targets open systems, where clients and servers do not have preexisting trust relationships. We have implemented the model within TrustBuilder, an architecture for negotiating trust between strangers based on properties other than identity. The implementation is the first example of content-triggered trust negotiation and currently supports accesscontrol for sensitive content disclosed by web and email clients.
Role-based accesscontrol (RBAC) models have been implemented not only in self-contained resource management products such as DBMSs and Operating Systems but also in a class of products called Enterprise Security Mana...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581136814
Role-based accesscontrol (RBAC) models have been implemented not only in self-contained resource management products such as DBMSs and Operating Systems but also in a class of products called Enterprise Security Management Systems (ESMS). ESMS products are used for centralized management of authorizations for resources resident in several heterogeneous systems (called target systems) distributed throughout the enterprise. The RBAC model used in an ESMS is called the Enterprise RBAC model (ERBAC). An ERBAC model can be used to specify not only sophisticated access requirements centrally for resources resident in several target systems, but also administrative data required to map those defined access requirements to the accesscontrol structures native to the target platforms. However, the ERBAC model (i.e., the RBAC implementation) supported in many commercial ESMS products has not taken full advantage of policy specification capabilities of RBAC. In this paper we describe an implementation of ESMS called the 'Role control Center' (RCC) that supports an ERBAC model that includes features such as general role hierarchy, static separation of duty constraints, and an advanced permission review facility (as defined in NIST's proposed RBAC standard). We outline the various modules in the RCC architecture and describe how they collectively provide support for authorization administration tasks at the enterprise and target-system levels.
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