作者:
Cohen, EveThomas, Roshan K.Winsborough, WilliamShands, DeborahNAI Labs
Network Associates Inc. 3415 S. Sepulveda Bld Suite 700 Los Angeles CA 90034 United States NAI Labs
Network Associates Inc. 1145 Herndon Parkway Suite 500 Herndon VA 20170 United States NAI Labs
Network Associates Inc. 3060 Washington Road Glenwood MD 21738 United States
To effectively participate in modern coalitions, member organizations must be able to share specific data and functionality with coalition partners, while ensuring that their resources are safe from inappropriate acce...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581134964
To effectively participate in modern coalitions, member organizations must be able to share specific data and functionality with coalition partners, while ensuring that their resources are safe from inappropriate access. This requires accesscontrolmodels, policies, and enforcement mechanisms for coalition resources. This paper describes a family of coalition-based accesscontrol (CBAC) models, developed to provide a range of expressivity with an accompanying range of implementation complexity. We define the protection state of a system, which provides the semantics of CBAC-based access policies. Finally, we briefly examine some of the issues for coalition access policy development and administration, and the complexity of implementing access enforcement mechanisms in a coalition environment.
This paper describes an application of authorization and accesscontrol based on the Role Based accesscontrol (RBAC) method and integrated in a comprehensive trust infrastructure of a health care application. The met...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581134964
This paper describes an application of authorization and accesscontrol based on the Role Based accesscontrol (RBAC) method and integrated in a comprehensive trust infrastructure of a health care application. The method is applied to a health care business process that involves multiple actors accessing data and resources needed for performing clinical and logistics tasks in the application. The notion of trust constituency is introduced as a concept for describing the context of authorisation. In addition, the applied RBAC covers time constraints, hierarchies and multi-level authorization rules for coping with the multi-actor nature and the complexity of the application domain. The DRIVE RBAC model clearly distinguishes between static role assignment to users and dynamic allocation of roles at session time. The paper, while focusing on the authorization and accesscontrol approach, also describes how the RBAC functions have been integrated in a trust infrastructure including smart cards.
We present the concept of an accesscontrol space and investigate how it may be useful in managing accesscontrol policies. An accesscontrol space represents the permission assignment state of a subject. We identify ...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581134964
We present the concept of an accesscontrol space and investigate how it may be useful in managing accesscontrol policies. An accesscontrol space represents the permission assignment state of a subject. We identify subspaces that have meaningful semantics. For example, the set permissions explicitly assigned to a subject defines its specified subspace, and constraints define the prohibited subspace. In analyzing these subspaces, we identify two problems: (1) often a significant portion of the accesscontrol space has unknown assignment semantics, meaning that it is not defined whether an assignment in this space should be permitted or not, and (2) often high-level assignments and constraints that are easily understood result in conflicts where permissions are both specified and prohibited. To solve these problems, we have developed a tool, called Gokyo, that enables definition and analysis of accesscontrol spaces. Gokyo computes the unknown subspace to show system administrators the ambiguous region and enable them to reduce it. Gokyo identifies conflicting subspaces and enables system administrators to handle subspaces as exceptions, if desired. We demonstrate the utility of Gokyo by analyzing a web server policy example.
The need for accesscontrol in a hierarchy arises in several different contexts. One such context is managing the information of an organization where the users are divided into different security classes depending on...
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The need for accesscontrol in a hierarchy arises in several different contexts. One such context is managing the information of an organization where the users are divided into different security classes depending on who has access to what. Several cryptographic solutions have been proposed to address this problem - the solutions are based on generating cryptographic keys for each security class such that the key for a lower level security class depends on the key for the security class that is higher up in the hierarchy. Most solutions use complex cryptographic techniques: integrating these into existing systems may not be trivial. Others have impractical requirement: if a user at a security level wants to access data at lower levels, then all intermediate nodes must be traversed. More-over, if there is an accesscontrol policy that does not conform to the hierarchical structure, such policy cannot be handled by existing solutions. We propose a new solution that overcomes the above mentioned shortcomings. Our solution not only addresses the problem of accesscontrol in a hierarchy but also can be used for general cases. It is a scheme similar to the RSA cryptosystem and can be easily incorporated in existing systems.
This paper presents an approach for formally specifying and enforcing security policies on web service implementations. Networked services in general, and web services in particular, require extensive amounts of code ...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581134964
This paper presents an approach for formally specifying and enforcing security policies on web service implementations. Networked services in general, and web services in particular, require extensive amounts of code to ensure that clients respect site-integrity constraints. We provide a language by which these constraints can be expressed and enforced automatically, portably and efficiently. Security policies in our system are specified in a language based on temporal logic, and are processed by an enforcement engine to yield site and platform-specific accesscontrol code. This code is integrated with a web server and platform-specific libraries to enforce the specified policy on a given web service. Our approach decouples the security policy specification from service implementations, provides a mandatory accesscontrol model for web services, and achieves good performance. We show that up to 22% of the code in a traditional web service module is dedicated to security checking functionality, including checks for client sequencing and parameter validation. We show that our prototype language implementation, WebGuard, enables web programmers to significantly reduce the amount of security checking code they need to develop manually. The quality of the code generated by WebGuard from formal policy specifications is competitive with the latency of handcrafted code to within a few percent.
In this paper we develop the concept of Usage control (UCON) that encompasses traditional accesscontrol, trust management, and digital rights management and goes beyond them in its definition and scope. While usage c...
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In this paper we develop the concept of Usage control (UCON) that encompasses traditional accesscontrol, trust management, and digital rights management and goes beyond them in its definition and scope. While usage control concepts have been mentioned off and on in the security literature for some time, there has been no systematic treatment so far. By unifying these three areas UCON offers a promising approach for the next generation of accesscontrol. Traditional accesscontrol has focused on a closed system where all users are known and primarily utilizes a server-side reference monitor within the system. Trust management has been introduced to cover authorization for strangers in an open environment such as the Internet. Digital rights management has dealt with client-side control of digital information usage. Each of these areas is motivated by its own target problems. Innovations in information technology and business models are creating new security and privacy issues which require elements of all three areas. To deal with these in a systematic unified manner we propose the new UCON model. UCON enables finer-grained control over usage of digital objects than that of traditional accesscontrol policies and models. For example, print once as opposed to unlimited prints. Unlike traditional accesscontrol or trust management, it covers both centrally controllable environment and an environment where central control authority is not available. UCON also deals with privacy issues in both commercial and non- commercial environments. In this paper we first discuss accesscontrol, trust management, and digital rights management and describe general concepts of UCON in the information security discipline. Then we define components of the UCON model and discuss how authorizations and accesscontrols can be applied in the UCON model. Next we demonstrate some applications of the UCON model and develop further details. We use several examples during these discussions to s
In this paper we present a novel scenario-driven role engineering process for RBAC roles. The scenario concept is of central significance for the presented approach. Due to the strong human factor in role engineering ...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781581134964
In this paper we present a novel scenario-driven role engineering process for RBAC roles. The scenario concept is of central significance for the presented approach. Due to the strong human factor in role engineering scenarios are a good means to drive the process. We use scenarios to derive permissions and to define tasks. Our approach considers changeability issues and enables the straightforward incorporation of changes into affected models. Finally we discuss the experiences we gained by applying the scenario-driven role engineering process in three case studies.
Scope: a variety of things are expressed under the heading of accesscontrol: permission assignments, constraints, activations, transition, hierarchies, ect. What things really need to be expressed?Concepts: What mode...
ISBN:
(纸本)9781581134964
Scope: a variety of things are expressed under the heading of accesscontrol: permission assignments, constraints, activations, transition, hierarchies, ect. What things really need to be expressed?Concepts: What modeling concepts are available to express these things? Where are we in understanding the usability of these models?Complexity-flexibility tradeoff: How do we make trade-offs between the flexibility of expression (expressive power) and applying more usable concepts? Can this be measured?Domain specificity: Improving ease of use often involves increasing the level of the specification using domain-specific techniques. What techniques are possible? How can we compare teh effectiveness of these techniques?Composition: How can the modularity of accesscontrol policies be leveraged? Is there any modularity?Completeness: How do we integrate accesscontrol effectively with support for audit and intrusion detection?
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