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Practical algorithm substitution attack on extractable signatures

DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 2022年第4期90卷 921-937页

作者： Zhao, Yi Liang, Kaitai Zhao, Yanqi Yang, Bo Ming, Yang Panaousis, Emmanouil Changan Univ Sch Informat Engn Xian 710064 Peoples R China Delft Univ Technol Fac Elect Engn Math & Comp Sci Delft Netherlands Xian Univ Posts & Telecommun Sch Cyberspace Secur Xian 710121 Peoples R China Shaanxi Normal Univ Sch Comp Sci Xian 710062 Peoples R China Univ Greenwich Sch Comp & Math Sci London England

An algorithm substitution attack (ASA) can undermine the security of cryptographic primitives by subverting the original implementation. An ASA succeeds when it extracts secrets without being detected. To launch an ASA on signature schemes, existing studies often needed to collect signatures with successive indices to extract the signing key. However, collection with successive indices requires uninterrupted surveillance of the communication channel and a low transmission loss rate in practice. This hinders the practical implementation of current ASAs, thus causing users to misbelieve that the threat incurred by ASA is only theoretical and far from reality. In this study, we first classify a group of schemes called extractable signatures that achieve traditional security (unforgeability) by reductions ending with key extraction, thus demonstrating that there is a generic and practical approach for ASA with this class of signatures. Further, we present the implementation of ASAs in which only two signatures and no further requirements are needed for the extraction of widely used discrete log-based signatures such as DSA, Schnorr, and modified ElGamal signature schemes. Our attack presents a realistic threat to current signature applications, which can also be implemented in open and unstable environments such as vehicular ad hoc networks. Finally, we prove that the proposed ASA is undetectable against polynomial time detectors and physical timing analysis.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack Extractable signatures Discrete log Arbitrary collection

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An algorithm substitution attack on Fiat-Shamir Signatures Based on Lattice

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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences 2022年第1期27卷 17-25页

作者： LIU Jinhui YU Yong WU Fusheng CHENG Yuehua ZHANG Huanguo School of Cyber Security Northwestern Polytechnical UniversityXi’an 710072ShaanxiChina Research&Development Institute of Northwestern Polytechnical University Shenzhen 518057GuangdongChina School of Cyber Security Xi’an University of Posts and TelecommunicationsXi’an 710121ShaanxiChina School of Computer Science Guizhou University of Finance and EconomicsGuiyang 550025GuizhouChina School of Computer Science Wuhan UniversityWuhan 430072HubeiChina

Many evidences have showed that some intelligence agencies(often called big brother)attempt to monitor citizens’communication by providing coerced citizens a lot of subverted cryptographic algorithms and coercing them to adopt these *** legalized services on large number of various applications and system architectures depend on digital signature techniques,in the context some coerced users who use double authentication preventing signatures to design some novel digital signature techniques,have some convincing dissertations to defuse requests from authorities and big brothers creating some corresponding subverted *** rapid progress in quantum computers,National Security Agency advisory memorandum and announcement of National Institute of Standards and Technology procedures from standardization focus on some cryptographic algorithms which are post quantum *** by these issues,we design an algorithm substitution attack against Fiat-Shamir family based on lattices(e.g.,BLISS,BG,Ring-TESLA,PASSSign and GLP)that are proven post-quantum computational *** also show an efficient deterable way to eliminate big brother’s threat by leaking signing keys from signatures on two messages to be *** proof shows that our schemes satisfy key extraction,undetectability and *** parameters analysis and performance evaluation,we demonstrate that our deterring subverted Fiat-Shamir signature is practical,which means that it can be applied to privacy and protection in some system architectures.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack double authentication preventing signatures lattice ring-SIS(small integer solution)problem

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algorithm substitution attacks from a Steganographic Perspective 17

Algorithm Substitution Attacks from a Steganographic Perspec...

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24th ACM-SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS)

作者： Berndt, Sebastian Liskiewicz, Maciej Univ Lubeck Lubeck Germany

ISBN: (纸本)9781450349468

The goal of an algorithm substitution attack (ASA), also called a subversion attack (SA), is to replace an honest implementation of a cryptographic tool by a subverted one which allows to leak private information while generating output indistinguishable from the honest output. Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway provided at CRYPTO '14 a formal security model to capture this kind of attacks and constructed practically implementable ASAs against a large class of symmetric encryption schemes. At CCS' 15, Ateniese, Magri, and Venturi extended this model to allow the attackers to work in a fully-adaptive and continuous fashion and proposed subversion attacks against digital signature schemes. Both papers also showed the impossibility of ASAs in cases where the cryptographic tools are deterministic. Also at CCS' 15, Bellare, Jaeger, and Kane strengthened the original model and proposed a universal ASA against sufficiently random encryption schemes. In this paper we analyze ASAs from the perspective of steganography - the well known concept of hiding the presence of secret messages in legal communications. While a close connection between ASAs and steganography is known, this lacks a rigorous treatment. We consider the common computational model for secret-key steganography and prove that successful ASAs correspond to secure stegosystems on certain channels and vice versa. This formal proof allows us to conclude that ASAs are stegosystems and to "rediscover" several results concerning ASAs known in the steganographic literature.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack subversion attack steganography symmetric encryption scheme digital signature

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Practical algorithm substitution attacks on Real-World Public-Key Cryptosystems

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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 2023年 18卷 5069-5081页

作者： Jiang, Haodong Han, Jiang Zhang, Zhenfeng Ma, Zhi Wang, Hong Henan Key Lab Network Cryptog Technol Zhengzhou 450001 Henan Peoples R China Chinese Acad Sci Inst Software Beijing 100190 Peoples R China

The revelations about massive surveillance have created significant interest in algorithm substitution attack (ASA), where an honest implementation of a cryptographic primitive is replaced by a subverted one which can help "big brother" to break cryptographic security while generating output indistinguishable from the honest output. The current known ASAs on public-key cryptography are either dedicated for a type of concrete constructions with specific internal, or restrictive when applying to the real-word cryptographic standards (Ateniese et al., ACM CCS'15;Russell et al., ACM CCS'17;Chen et al., ASIACRYPT'20). In this paper, we first present a practical undetectable substitution for a general randomized algorithm with certain structure such that the randomness can be revealed to the big brother. Then, instantiating this randomized algorithm, we present a series of ASAs on core primitives in public-key cryptography including public-key encryption, key encapsulation mechanism, key exchange, and digital signature. In particular, our ASAs are universal in the sense that they do not rely on the internal description of the underlying cryptographic algorithm. Moreover, our ASAs are also practical since they can affect not only the widely deployed cryptographic standards, but also the ongoing NIST post-quantum standards.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack randomized algorithm public-key cryptography

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algorithm substitution-Resistant SM9-Based Searchable Encryption With Cryptographic Reverse Firewall for Cloud Storage

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CONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION-PRACTICE & EXPERIENCE 2025年第9-11期37卷

作者： Gao, Gaimei Duan, Mingbo Xun, Yaling Liu, Chunxia Dang, Weichao Taiyuan Univ Sci & Technol Dept Comp Sci & Technol Taiyuan Peoples R China

To protect data privacy in cloud storage, sensitive data is commonly encrypted before being uploaded to a cloud storage server (CSS). This process challenges secure and efficient ciphertext retrieval. Identity-based encryption with keyword search (IBEKS) enables secure ciphertext retrieval but remains vulnerable to internal adversary attacks, particularly algorithm substitution attacks (ASA) in SM9-based searchable encryption schemes. Additionally, existing protocols lack proactive defense mechanisms, making them vulnerable to insider threats that compromise system integrity. To address these challenges, this article proposes SM9-based Searchable Encryption with Cryptographic Reverse Firewall (SM9SE-CRF), a novel scheme designed to resist internal attacks while ensuring efficient ciphertext retrieval. Initially, a re-randomizable IBEKS framework is developed as the foundation for constructing the SM9 searchable encryption scheme, enhancing both security and performance. Furthermore, Cryptographic reverse firewalls are deployed at both the Key Generation Center (KGC) and user ends, which dynamically re-randomize cryptographic parameters to mitigate risks posed by internal adversaries. The SM9SE-CRF scheme is implemented using the JPBC library and evaluated through comprehensive security and performance analyses. Results demonstrate that SM9SE-CRF effectively mitigates offline keyword guessing attacks and ASA threats from malicious insiders. Performance evaluations reveal that at a 128-bit security level, SM9SE-CRF achieves a 93% reduction in runtime compared to existing schemes, with the cryptographic reverse firewall adding merely 1.16% overhead. This minimal computational cost highlights the practical applicability of SM9SE-CRF in privacy-preserving cloud storage systems, particularly in enterprise data sharing, secure outsourced storage, and cloud-based information retrieval applications.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack cryptographic reverse firewall identity-based encryption with keyword search searchable encryption SM9 algorithm

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substitution attacks Against Sigma Protocols 14th

Substitution Attacks Against Sigma Protocols

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14th International Symposium on Cyberspace Safety and Security (CSS)

作者： Lin, Yuliang Chen, Rongmao Wang, Yi Wang, Baosheng Liu, Lin Natl Univ Def Technol Sch Comp Changsha Peoples R China

ISBN: (纸本)9783031180675;9783031180668

Inspired by the Snowden revelations, Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway proposed the notion of algorithm substitution attack (ASA) where the attacker could subvert cryptographic algorithms to leak secret information stealthily. Since their work, there have been several ASAs proposed for various cryptographic schemes such as encryption schemes and digital signatures. In this work, we investigate the first study of ASA against Sigma protocols which are widely considered as an important and useful cryptographic tool. Concretely, we formally define the ASA models for subverting Sigma protocols and propose two concrete attacks that are mainly inspired by the attacks by Bellare et al. (CRYPTO'14) and Chen et al. (ASIACRYPT'20). In our proposed attacks, a subverted prover could leak the secret witness to the outside world in undetectable way by generating biased commitment, and a subverted verifier could break the knowledge soundness by choosing a biased challenge. Several concrete Sigma protocols are also provided to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed attack. Our work shows that ASAs have powerful impacts on Sigma protocols, and thus it is highly desirable for the research community to design new Sigma protocols that could resist ASAs.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack Sigma protocols Witness recovery

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Generic Construction: Cryptographic Reverse Firewalls for Public Key Encryption With Keyword Search in Cloud Storage

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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING 2024年第2期12卷 405-418页

作者： Ming, Yang Liu, Hang Wang, Chenhao Zhao, Yi Changan Univ Sch Informat Engn Xian 710064 Shaanxi Peoples R China

The Snowden incident illustrates that an adversary may launch an algorithm substitution attack (ASA) by tampering with the algorithms of protocol participants to obtain users' secret information. A measure against ASA is to equip the protocol participants with cryptographic reverse firewalls (CRF). Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) as a cryptographic primitive allows users to search encrypted file in cloud servers while ensuring the security of the original file. The existing CRF constructions for PEKS does not consider the trust level of CRFs, leaving honest-but-curious CRF to deal with trapdoors that should be sent in the secure channels, which brings new security risks. This article first introduces the notion of malleable designated tester public key encryption with keyword search (M-DPEKS). Based on M-DPEKS, we propose the generic construction of public key encryption with keyword search with cryptographic reverse firewalls to overcome the privacy leakage issue in cloud storage. Security proof indicates the generic construction is secure against ASA. Lastly, we instantiate the generic construction with a concrete M-DPEKS scheme and analyze the computation cost and communication overhead to evaluate the efficiency.

关键词： Cryptographic reverse firewall public key encryption algorithm substitution attack keyword search cloud storage

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Subverting Cryptographic Protocols from a Fine-Grained Perspective- A Case Study on 2-Party ECDSA 29th

Subverting Cryptographic Protocols from a Fine-Grained Persp...

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29th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP)

作者： Cheng, Jialiu Wang, Yi Chen, Rongmao Huang, Xinyi Natl Univ Def Technol Sch Comp Changsha Peoples R China Jinan Univ Guangzhou Peoples R China

ISBN: (纸本)9789819750276;9789819750283

The revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 rekindled concerns within the cryptographic community regarding the potential subversion of cryptographic systems. Bellare et al. (CRYPTO'14) introduced the notion of algorithm substitution attacks (ASAs), which aim to covertly leak sensitive information by undermining individual cryptographic primitives. In this work, we delve deeply into the realm of ASAs against protocols built upon cryptographic primitives. In particular, we revisit the existing ASA model proposed by Berndt et al. (AsiaCCS'22), providing a more fine-grained perspective. We introduce a novel ASA model tailored for protocols, capable of capturing a wide spectrum of subversion attacks. Our model features a modular representation of subverted parties within protocols, along with fine-grained definitions of undetectability. To illustrate the practicality of our model, we apply it to Lindell's two-party ECDSA protocol (CRYPTO'17), unveiling a range of ASAs targeting the protocol's parties with the objective of extracting secret key shares. Our work offers a comprehensive ASA model suited to cryptographic protocols, providing a more precise framework for understanding ASAs against protocols.

关键词： algorithm substitution attack Cryptographic Protocol 2-Party ECDSA

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A More Cautious Approach to Security Against Mass Surveillance 22nd

A More Cautious Approach to Security Against Mass Surveillan...

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22nd International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption (FSE)

作者： Degabriele, Jean Paul Farshim, Pooya Poettering, Bertram Univ London Royal Holloway London England Queens Univ Belfast Belfast Antrim North Ireland Ruhr Univ Bochum Bochum Germany

ISBN: (纸本)9783662481165;9783662481158

At CRYPTO 2014 Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway (BPR) presented a formal treatment of symmetric encryption in the light of algorithm substitution attacks (ASAs), which may be employed by 'big brother' entities for the scope of mass surveillance. Roughly speaking, in ASAs big brother may bias ciphertexts to establish a covert channel to leak vital cryptographic information. In this work, we identify a seemingly benign assumption implicit in BPR's treatment and argue that it artificially (and severely) limits big brother's capabilities. We then demonstrate the critical role that this assumption plays by showing that even a slight weakening of it renders the security notion completely unsatisfiable by any, possibly deterministic and/or stateful, symmetric encryption scheme. We propose a refined security model to address this shortcoming, and use it to restore the positive result of BPR, but caution that this defense does not stop most other forms of covert-channel attacks.

关键词： Mass surveillance algorithm substitution attack Symmetric encryption Covert channel

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On the Security of Symmetric Encryption Against Mass Surveillance

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IEEE ACCESS 2020年 8卷 175625-175636页

作者： Sun, Da-Zhi Mu, Yi Tianjin Univ Coll Intelligence & Comp Tianjin Key Lab Adv Networking TANK Tianjin 300350 Peoples R China Fujian Normal Univ Coll Math & Informat Fujian Prov Key Lab Network Secur & Cryptol Fuzhou 350007 Peoples R China

For mass surveillance, the algorithm substitution attacks (ASAs) are serious security threats to the symmetric encryption schemes. At CRYPTO 2014, Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway (BPR) formally developed the security notions of decryptability, undetectability, and surveillance and presented a unique ciphertext symmetric encryption scheme against all possible ASAs. At FSE 2015, Degabriele, Farshim, and Poettering (DFP) relaxed the correctness of decryptability and presented an input-triggered ASA, which meets the BPR security definitions but violates the security of the BPR unique ciphertext scheme. Hence, DFP refined the security notions of detectability and subversion resistance to remove their ASA from the BPR unique ciphertext scheme. At CCS 2015, Bellare, Jaeger, and Kane (BJK) also developed the security notion of key recovery to make the input-triggered ASA infeasible. We investigate ASAs on the symmetric encryption scheme. Our contribution is twofold. (1) We propose a new trigger ASA against the symmetric encryption scheme. Our proposed ASA cannot be captured by the BJK security definitions. Comparatively, the DFP security definitions can detect our proposed ASA. In the view of ASAs, this result demonstrates that the DFP security definitions are not identical to the BJK security definitions. (2) We improve the DFP definition of subversion resistance. DFP proved that the BPR unique ciphertext scheme defeats the input-triggered ASA under their subversion resistance definition. However, we show that the BPR unique ciphertext scheme fails to meet the DFP subversion resistance definition due to our proposed ASA. Therefore, an improved definition on subversion resistance is proposed to cover all existing trigger ASAs. We prove that the BPR unique ciphertext scheme is secure under our improved definition. Therefore, we believe that our improved definition is more suitable to evaluate the ASA security of the symmetric encryption scheme.

关键词： Encryption Business process re-engineering Resistance Surveillance Games Mass surveillance algorithm substitution attack symmetric encryption decryptability undetectability detectability key recovery subversion resistance

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