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Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 2018年 108卷 317-330页

作者： Rees-Jones, Alex Univ Penn Wharton Sch Philadelphia PA 19104 USA

Strategy-proof mechanisms eliminate the possibility for gain from strategic misrepresentation of preferences. If market participants respond optimally, these mechanisms permit the observation of true preferences and avoid the implicit punishment of market participants who do not try to "game the system." Using new data from a flagship application of the matching literature the medical residency match-I study if these potential benefits are fully realized. I present evidence that some students pursue futile attempts at strategic misrepresentation, and I examine the causes and correlates of this behavior. These results inform the assessment of the costs and benefits of strategy-proof mechanisms and demonstrate broad challenges in mechanism design. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： Matching deferred acceptance algorithm Suboptimal behavior

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Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences

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ECONOMICS LETTERS 2018年 170卷 39-41页

作者： Haake, Claus-Jochen Stroh-Maraun, Nadja Paderborn Univ Warburger Str 100 D-33098 Paderborn Germany

We show that modifications of the Boston school choice mechanism, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm and the top trading cycles algorithm where the colleges' priorities are adjusted according to students' preferences in a "first preferences first" manner generate the same outcome. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the question which of the three algorithms is chosen becomes immaterial. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.

关键词： School choice Boston mechanism deferred acceptance algorithm Top trading cycles Manipulability

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Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm

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ECONOMICS LETTERS 2011年第2期112卷 135-137页

作者： Kumano, Taro Watabe, Masahiro Zirve Univ Dept Econ TR-27260 Gaziantep Turkey Washington Univ Dept Econ St Louis MO 63130 USA

We examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm. Under substitutable and quota-filling choice functions, we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like. Our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

关键词： deferred acceptance algorithm Multiple equilibria Dominant strategy implementation

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The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 2017年 102卷 44-55页

作者： Jiao, Zhenhua Tian, Guoqiang Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ Inst Adv Res Shanghai 200433 Peoples R China Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ Sch Econ Shanghai 200433 Peoples R China Texas A&M Univ Dept Econ College Stn TX 77843 USA

This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for agents on the proposing side under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. Neither the Blocking Lemma nor the incentive compatibility can be guaranteed if the preference condition is weaker than Keywords: the extended max-min criterion. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： Many-to-many matching Blocking Lemma Max-min preferences deferred acceptance algorithm Strategy-proofness

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Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism

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REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN 2017年第1期21卷 49-63页

作者： Cantala, David Pereyra, Juan Sebastian Colegio Mexico Ctr Estudios Econ Mexico City DF Mexico Univ Libre Bruxelles ECARES Brussels Belgium FRS FNRS Brussels Belgium

We study school choice markets where the non-strategy-proof Boston mechanism is used to assign students to schools. Inspired by previous field and experimental evidence, we analyze a type of behavior called priority-driven: students have a common ranking over the schools and then give a bonus in their submitted preferences to those schools for which they have high priority. We first prove that under this behavior, there is a unique stable and efficient matching, which is the outcome of the Boston mechanism. Second, we show that the three most prominent mechanisms on school choice (Boston, deferred acceptance, and top trading cycles) coincide when students' submitted preferences are priority-driven. Finally, we run some computational simulations to show that the assumption of priority-driven preferences can be relaxed by introducing an idiosyncratic preference component, and our qualitative results carry over to a more general model of preferences.

关键词： Two-sided many-to-one matching School choice Boston algorithm Manipulation strategies deferred acceptance algorithm

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Linkage based deferred acceptance optimization

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INFORMATION SCIENCES 2016年 349卷 65-76页

作者： Kiran, Deep Panigrahi, B. K. Das, Swagatam Kumar, Nitesh Indian Inst Technol Delhi Dept Elect Engn New Delhi India Indian Stat Inst Elect & Commun Sci Unit Kolkata India

In general, heuristic optimization techniques lose some of the optimal solution of the objective function in the optimization process. This paper proposes a concept to retain those variables that might help in accelerating the complete optimization process. The motivation is to derive linkages between variables in a population set that will be used in crossover strategy. This crossover strategy is dependent on a deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA). Also, the property of linkages or interrelation is implemented to derive the relation between variables among dimensions. This paper proposes a linkage based deferred acceptance optimization (LDAO) technique. It is observed that the proposed algorithm has proved its efficacy on the set of unconstrained and constrained objective functions. Also, the proposed algorithm is tested on challenging real world problems (CEC 2011) and the functions present in CEC 2014 competition. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： deferred acceptance algorithm Linkage strategy Evolutionary computation Global optimization

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On Weighted Kernels of Two Posets

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ORDER-A JOURNAL ON THE THEORY OF ORDERED SETS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 2016年第1期33卷 51-65页

作者： Fleiner, Tamas Janko, Zsuzsanna Budapest Univ Technol & Econ Dept Comp Sci & Informat Theory Magyar Tudosok Korutja 2 H-1117 Budapest Hungary MTA ELTE Egervary Res Grp Budapest Hungary Eotvos Lorand Univ Fac Sci Inst Math Pazmany Peter Setany 1-C H-1117 Budapest Hungary

A recent result of Aharoni Berger and Gorelik (Order 31(1), 35-43, 2014) is a weighted generalization of the well-known theorem of Sands Sauer and Woodrow (Theory Ser. B 33(3), 271-275, 1982) on monochromatic paths. The authors prove the existence of a so called weighted kernel for any pair of weighted posets on the same ground set. In this work, we point out that this result is closely related to the stable marriage theorem of Gale and Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1), 9-15, 1962), and we generalize Blair's theorem by showing that weighted kernels form a lattice under a certain natural order. To illustrate the applicability of our approach, we prove further weighted generalizations of the Sands Sauer Woodrow result.

关键词： Posets Lattices Kernels Stable marriages Choice functions deferred acceptance algorithm

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Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endowments 15

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endow...

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15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)

作者： Hamada, Naoto Kurata, Ryoji Ueda, Suguru Suzuki, Takamasa Yokoo, Makoto Kyushu Univ Motooka 744 Fukuoka Fukuoka Japan

ISBN: (纸本)9781450342391

Although minimum quotas are important in many real-world markets, existing strategyproof mechanisms require an unrealistic assumption that all students consider all schools acceptable (and vice-versa). We develop a strategyproof matching mechanism called Priority-List based deferred acceptance mechanism with Minimum Quotas (PLDA-MQ), which works under more realistic assumptions: (i) a student considers (at least) one particular school, which we call her initial endowment school, acceptable, and vice-versa, and (ii) the initial endowments satisfy all the minimum quotas. We require a matching to respect initial endowments;each student must be assigned to a school that is at least as good as her initial endowment. PLDA-MQ obtains the student-optimal matching within all matchings that respect minimum quotas/initial endowments and satisfies a stability requirement called Priority-List based (PL-) stability.

关键词： Two-sided matching deferred acceptance algorithm Minimum quotas

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Bipartite Matching under Stated Preferences: Matching Vrije Universiteit Students with Universities Abroad

Bipartite Matching under Stated Preferences: Matching Vrije ...

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作者： Maaike Haak Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

学位级别：硕士

This thesis focuses on the bipartite matching under stated preferences problem. This is a problem where the International Office of the Vrije Universiteit has to deal with; it has to match VU students with universities abroad each year. Employees of the Interna- tional Office match the students by hand with the so-called serial dictatorship algorithm. This is very time-consuming, therefore the algorithm will be automated. Furthermore, the deferred acceptance algorithm and an integer linear programming approach will be implemented on some datasets to see if getting an improved matching is possible.

关键词： Bipartite matching under stated preferences stable marriage deferred acceptance algorithm serial dictatorship algorithm International Office

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Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endowments 16

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endow...

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

作者： Naoto Hamada Ryoji Kurata Suguru Ueda Takamasa Suzuki Makoto Yokoo Kyushu University

ISBN: (纸本)9781510855083

Although minimum quotas are important in many real-world markets, existing strategyproof mechanisms require an unrealistic assumption that all students consider all schools acceptable (and vice-versa). We develop a strategyproof matching mechanism called Priority-List based deferred acceptance mechanism with Minimum Quotas (PLDA-MQ), which works under more realistic assumptions: (i) a student considers (at least) one particular school, which we call her initial endowment school, acceptable, and vice-versa, and (ii) the initial endowments satisfy all the minimum quotas. We require a matching to respect initial endowments; each student must be assigned to a school that is at least as good as her initial endowment. PLDA-MQ obtains the student-optimal matching within all matchings that respect minimum quotas/initial endowments and satisfies a stability requirement called Priority-List based (PL-) stability.

关键词： Two-sided matching deferred acceptance algorithm Minimum quotas Endowments Quotas schools Students minimum world markets

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