The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferredacceptance allocation rules. Two ne...
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The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferredacceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms-individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity-are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferredacceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferredacceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferredacceptance rules.
This paper reports on a case study of the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. Two criteria are used in considering applicants. The first criterion, determined by perso...
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This paper reports on a case study of the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. Two criteria are used in considering applicants. The first criterion, determined by personal socio-economic characteristics, is used to make decisions about the privilege of getting on-campus housing. The second criterion is used for the actual assignment of the students who were found eligible for on-campus housing to specific dormitories-here the priority is determined by academic seniority and academic excellence. A modification of the classic stable matching model that allows for an "entrance criterion" is developed and analyzed. In particular, a new concept of quasi-stable outcomes is introduced and an algorithm that produces such an outcome with desirable properties is described. The algorithm was implemented successfully for the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion toward the 2004/2005 academic year.
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensatio...
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We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
W, study, in many-to-one matching markets, the restabilization process of a group-stable matching disrupted by a change in the population. If firms are not allowed to fire workers, the market always reaches stability ...
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W, study, in many-to-one matching markets, the restabilization process of a group-stable matching disrupted by a change in the population. If firms are not allowed to fire workers, the market always reaches stability again only if the disruption is due to the opening of positions by firms, or the retirement of workers. This is shown by designing an algorithm which always leads to a group-stable matching. The algorithm mimics markets where firms make offers and workers accept the offer of their favorite firm. If firms are allowed to fire workers, we construct another algorithm which produces a group-stable matching when the disruption is due to the entrance of workers or the closure of positions. In this algorithm, unemployed workers make offers to firms. In both cases of disruption, we require firms to have q-substitutable preferences. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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