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14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)

作者： Goto, Masahiro Kurata, Ryoji Hamada, Naoto Iwasaki, Atsushi Yokoo, Makoto Kyushu Univ Fukuoka Japan Univ Electrocommun Chofu Tokyo Japan

ISBN: (纸本)9781450334136

This paper considers matching problems with hierarchical regional minimum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, it is known that nonwastefulness and fairness (which compose stability) are incompatible when minimum quotas are imposed. We develop a new strategy-proof nonwasteful mechanism called Adaptive deferred acceptance with Regional minimum Quotas (ADA-RQ), which is fairer than an existing nonwasteful mechanism called Multi-Stage DA with Regional minimum Quotas (MSDA-RQ).

关键词： Two-sided matching deferred acceptance algorithm Minimum quotas

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Overlay Cognitive Radio Networks: A Distributed Matching Scheme for User Pairing 11

Overlay Cognitive Radio Networks: A Distributed Matching Sch...

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11th IEEE International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IEEE IWCMC)

作者： Roumeliotis, Anargyros J. Vassaki, Stavroula Panagopoulos, Athanasios D. Natl Tech Univ Athens Sch Elect & Comp Engn Athens Greece

ISBN: (纸本)9781479953448

In this paper, an overlay cognitive radio network is considered where each primary user leases access time to selected secondary users in exchange for their cooperation. To optimize the network performance in a distributed way and being inspired by matching theory, we model the cognitive radio network as a matching market and we deal with the pairing problem among the primary and the secondary users as a many-to-one matching problem with externalities. A modified scheme based on the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism is proposed, leading to a stable matching. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated and compared to the performance of a centralized scheme that results in optimal performance for the primary users and a simple pairing scheme that is based on the distance among the users. As is highlighted in the numerical analysis, the proposed mechanism leads to similar performance with the centralized scheme in terms of primary users' utility whereas, it outperforms the other two schemes from the perspective of secondary users.

关键词： overlay cognitive radio user pairing matching theory externalities deferred acceptance algorithm stable matching

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Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Matching Theory Approach 81

Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Matching The...

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81st IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring)

作者： Vassaki, Stavroula Poulakis, Marios I. Panagopoulos, Athanasios D. Natl Tech Univ Athens Sch Elect & Comp Engn Athens Greece

ISBN: (纸本)9781479980888

In this paper, we analyze the problem of spectrum leasing in cognitive radio networks using principles from matching theory. More specifically, we deal with the pairing problem among the primary and the secondary users and we propose two different matching schemes that take into account the preferences of each user in terms of performance. The first scheme is a one-to-one matching scheme that is based on the deferred acceptance algorithm whereas the second one refers to a one-to-many matching algorithm where each primary user may cooperate with more than one secondary user. The performance of both proposed schemes is finally investigated for various network parameters and some useful conclusions are drawn.

关键词： matching theory cognitive radio spectrum leasing deferred acceptance algorithm one-to-one one-to-many

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Improving Fairness in Nonwasteful Matching with Hierarchical Regional Minimum Quotas 15

Improving Fairness in Nonwasteful Matching with Hierarchical...

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

作者： Masahiro Goto Ryoji Kurata Naoto Hamada Atsushi Iwasaki Makoto Yokoo Kyushu University University of Electro-Communications

ISBN: (纸本)9781450337717

This paper considers matching problems with hierarchical regional minimum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, it is known that nonwastefulness and fairness (which compose stability) are incompatible when minimum quotas are imposed. We develop a new strategy-proof nonwasteful mechanism called Adaptive deferred acceptance with Regional minimum Quotas (ADARQ), which is fairer than an existing nonwasteful mechanism called Multi-Stage DA with Regional minimum Quotas (MSDA-RQ).

关键词： Two-sided matching deferred acceptance algorithm Minimum Quotas

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A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea

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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 2014年 154卷 543-561页

作者： Tang, Qianfeng Yu, Jingsheng Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ Sch Econ Shanghai 200433 Peoples R China

We revisit the school choice problem with consent proposed by Kesten [12], which seeks to improve the efficiency of the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) by obtaining students' consent to give up their priorities. We observe that for students to consent, we should use their consent only when their assignments are Pareto unimprovable. Inspired by this perspective, we propose a new algorithm which iteratively reruns DA after removing students who have been matched with underdemanded schools, together with their assignments. While this algorithm is outcome equivalent to Kesten's EADAM, it is more accessible to practitioners due to its computational simplicity and transparency on consenting incentives. We also adapt this algorithm for school choice problems with weak priorities to simplify the stable improvement cycles algorithm proposed by Erdil and Ergin [8]. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： School choice deferred acceptance algorithm Pareto efficiency Matching

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A dynamic school choice model

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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 2013年 80卷 100-114页

作者： Sebastian Pereyra, Juan Colegio Mexico Ctr Estudios Econ Mexico City 10740 DF Mexico

This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their current positions or choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a solution always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamically strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： School choice Overlapping agents Dynamic matching deferred acceptance algorithm

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Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules

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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 2012年第1期75卷 428-434页

作者： Kumano, Taro Watabe, Masahiro Washington Univ Dept Econ St Louis MO 63130 USA Zirve Univ Dept Econ TR-27260 Gaziantep Turkey

Most priority-based assignment problems are solved using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Kojima (2010) shows that stability and nonbossiness are incompatible. We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies a weaker notion of nonbossiness for every substitutable priority structure. We also discuss the multiplicity of dominant strategy equilibria of the preference revelation game induced by the deferred acceptance algorithm. We show that even untruthful dominant strategy equilibria lead to the truthful equilibrium outcome. In other words, the deferred acceptance algorithm is dominant strategy implementable. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： deferred acceptance algorithm Dominant strategy implementation Stability Weak nonbossiness Multiple equilibria

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An Agent-Based Solution Framework for Inter-Block Yard Crane Scheduling Problems

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International Journal of Transportation Science and Technology 2012年第2期1卷 109-130页

作者： Omor Sharif Nathan Huynh Mashrur Chowdhury Jose M.Vidal Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering University of South CarolinaColumbiaSC 29208USA Glenn Department of Civil Engineering Clemson UniversityClemsonSC 29634USA Department of Computer and Science Engineering University of South CarolinaColumbiaSC 29208USA

The efficiency of yard operations is critical to the overall productivity of a container terminal because the yard serves as the interface between the landside and waterside *** container terminals use yard cranes to transfer containers between the yard and trucks(both external and internal).To facilitate vessel operations,an efficient work schedule for the yard cranes is necessary given varying work volumes among yard blocks with different planning *** paper investigated an agent-based approach to assign and relocate yard cranes among yard blocks based on the forecasted work *** goal of our study is to reduce the work volume that remains incomplete at the end of a planning *** offered several preference functions for yard cranes and blocks which are modeled as *** preference functions are designed to find effective schedules for yard *** addition,we examined various rules for the initial assignment of yard cranes to *** analysis demonstrated that our model can effectively and efficiently reduce the percentage of incomplete work volume for any real-world sized problem.

关键词： Yard crane scheduling container terminals multi-agent systems deferred acceptance algorithm

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Agreement toward stability in matching markets

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REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN 2011年第4期15卷 293-316页

作者： Cantala, David El Colegio Mexico Mexico City 10740 DF Mexico

For firms with responsive preferences, we prove that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to any firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. This follows from a generalization of the Decomposition Lemma. The result does not hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. Nevertheless, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously least preferred by workers, and most preferred by firms. When a firm quasi-stable matching is fed into our extension of the deferred acceptance algorithm (where firms propose), the existence of this matching guarantees the success of the algorithm.

关键词： Matching Lattice Unanimity deferred acceptance algorithm

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Axioms for deferred acceptance

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ECONOMETRICA 2010年第2期78卷 633-653页

作者： Kojima, Fuhito Manea, Mihai Stanford Univ Dept Econ Stanford CA 94305 USA MIT Dept Econ Cambridge MA 02142 USA

The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms-individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity-are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules.

关键词： deferred acceptance algorithm stable allocations axioms individually rational monotonicity weak Maskin monotonicity population monotonicity non-wastefulness

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