The integer factorizationproblem, concerning the product of two primes N = pq, has been a focal point for researchers since its rise to prominence with the RSA algorithm, a renowned public key scheme. It is well know...
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The integer factorizationproblem, concerning the product of two primes N = pq, has been a focal point for researchers since its rise to prominence with the RSA algorithm, a renowned public key scheme. It is well known that the integer factorizationproblem can be solved by the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm in sub-exponential time, this challenge may also find resolution in polynomial time under certain conditions for the primes. In this paper, we revisit the problem of factoring RSA moduli with the implicit hint, where the implicit hint is the shared bits of primes. As for k RSA moduli, we present a novel implicitfactorization approach applicable when the unknown multiples ap of the prime factors p share a certain number of most significant bits (MSBs) or least significant bits (LSBs). By drawing inspiration from addressing the Approximate Common Divisor problem (ACDP), we transform this problem into solving the small roots of k-1 trivariate polynomials. To compute these small roots, we employ Coppersmith's method to construct a lattice basis for the modular polynomials. We modify the lattice basis by introducing new variables, achieving an optimal bound in the MSB and LSB cases. Our attack breaks the RSA system and improves upon all previous attacks on such variants when the amount of the shared bits is sufficiently large. Concluding our paper, we meticulously validate the theoretical analysis results, with experimental data confirming the full practical feasibility of our attack on such an RSA variant system.
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