Matrix games under time constraints generalize classical matrix games by incorporating the need for players to wait after interactions before engaging in new ones. As a result, the population divides into active and i...
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Matrix games under time constraints generalize classical matrix games by incorporating the need for players to wait after interactions before engaging in new ones. As a result, the population divides into active and inactive individuals, where only active individuals are capable of engaging in interactions. Consequently, differences in the fitness of strategies are determined solely by the payoffs of active individuals. Similarly to classical matrix games, the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) can also be defined in this model as a strategy that, if adopted by the majority of the population, has a higher fitness than any mutant phenotype (Garay et al. in J Theor Biol 415:1-12, 2017. https://***/10.1016/***.2016.11.029) . We recently introduced a generalized replicator dynamics that takes time constraints into account (Varga in J Math Biol 90:6, 2024. https://***/10.1007/s00285-024-02170-0). Using this, we proved that if a strategy is an ESS under time constraints, then the associated fixed point of the dynamics is asymptotically stable. However, evolutionary stability is not necessary for asymptotic stability. In other words, asymptotic stability does not provide a full characterization of ESS, even under the standard replicatordynamics in matrix games (Taylor and Jonker in Math Biosci 40(1):145-156, 1978. https://***/10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9). To address this, Cressman proposed the concept of strong stability: a strategy p\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\textbf{p}$$\end{document} is strongly stable if it is a convex combination of some strategies, the average strategy of the population converges to p\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usep
This paper analyses the role of information in public sanitation unexpected incident management,for example,the Chinese SARS crisis in 2003year,used evolutionary game *** the model,government takes the forcibly interv...
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This paper analyses the role of information in public sanitation unexpected incident management,for example,the Chinese SARS crisis in 2003year,used evolutionary game *** the model,government takes the forcibly intervened management that changes the factor game payoff,so the game equilibrium evolvement *** paper educes the dynamic functions that include diffusion phase and convergence phase and will be convergence in the finite *** analyses the effect that government takes opening information measure in different phases,through made strategy learning barriers endogenously disposed that is the function of the information opening *** draws the conclusion that government open information in favor of control the unexpected incident diffusion and accelerating dynamic functions *** paper uses the diffusion and convergence dynamic functions and quantitatively analyzes the decreasing numbers of SARS cases after government taking the opening information measure based on the SARS cases in 2003.
We consider a generalization of replicatordynamics as a non-cooperative evolutionary game-theoretic model of a community of N agents. All agents update their individual mixed strategy profiles to increase their total...
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We consider a generalization of replicatordynamics as a non-cooperative evolutionary game-theoretic model of a community of N agents. All agents update their individual mixed strategy profiles to increase their total payoff from the rest of the community. The properties of attractors in this dynamics are studied. Evidence is presented that under certain conditions the typical attractors of the system are corners of state space where each agent has specialized to a pure strategy, and/or the community exhibits diversity, i.e., all strategies are represented in the final states. The model suggests that new pure strategies whose payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities with respect to the existing ones can destabilize existing attractors if N is sufficiently large, and be regarded as innovations that enhance the diversity of the community.
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