The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to i...
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In display and mobile advertising, the most significant development in recent years is the Real-Time bidding (RTB), which allows selling and buying in real-time one ad impression at a time. Since then, RTB has fundame...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9781450333177
In display and mobile advertising, the most significant development in recent years is the Real-Time bidding (RTB), which allows selling and buying in real-time one ad impression at a time. Since then, RTB has fundamentally changed the landscape of the digital marketing by scaling the buying process across a large number of available inventories. The demand for automation, integration and optimisation in RTB brings new research opportunities in the IR/DM/ML fields. However, despite its rapid growth and huge potential, many aspects of RTB remain unknown to the research community for many reasons. In this tutorial, together with invited distinguished speakers from online advertising industry, we aim to bring the insightful knowledge from the real-world systems to bridge the gaps and provide an overview of the fundamental infrastructure, algorithms, and technical and research challenges of this new frontier of computational advertising. We will also introduce to researchers the datasets, tools, and platforms which are publicly available thus they can get hands-on quickly.
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding ...
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This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the other bidders. In the two-bidder case, we derive an optimal randomized bidding algorithm, by which the disadvantaged bidder can procure at least half of the auction objects despite the adversary's a priori knowledge of his algorithm. In the general k-bidder case, if the number of objects is a multiple of k, an optimal randomized bidding algorithm is found. If the k-1 disadvantaged bidders employ that same algorithm, each of them can obtain at least 1/k of the objects regardless of the bidding algorithm the adversary uses. These two algorithms are based on closed-form solutions to certain multivariate probability distributions. In situations where a closed-form solution cannot be obtained, we study a restricted class of bidding algorithms as an approximation to desired optimal algorithms.
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