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97th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC-Spring)

作者： Liao, Yangzhe Song, Yuanyan Liu, Lin Han, Yi Wuhan Univ Technol Sch Informat Engn Wuhan 430070 Peoples R China

ISBN: (纸本)9798350311143

This paper proposes an intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)-assisted wireless inland ship multi-access edge computing (MEC) network architecture with time windows, where UAV is deployed to serve time-constrained unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) with IRS. The task execution efficiency maximization optimization problem is formulated by joint considering IRS phase-shift vector, UAVs hovering coordinates and the task execution indicator. To tackle the formulated challenging problem, a heuristic solution is proposed. First, an enhanced differential evolution algorithm is proposed to optimize UAVs hovering coordinates. Moreover, IRS phase-shift vector and task execution indicator are jointly optimized in an iterative manner by the proposed modified deferred acceptance algorithm. Numerical results verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in comparison with some selected advanced algorithms in terms of task execution efficiency.

关键词： Intelligent Reflecting Surface Multi-access Edge Computing Unmanned Surface Vehicles deferred acceptance algorithm

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MatchVNE: A Stable Virtual Network Embedding Strategy Based on Matching Theory 15

MatchVNE: A Stable Virtual Network Embedding Strategy Based ...

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15th International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS)

作者： Kumar, Keerthan T. G. Srivastava, Ankit Satpathy, Anurag Addya, Sourav Kanti Koolagudi, S. G. Natl Inst Technol Karnataka Dept Comp Sci & Engn Surathkal India Natl Inst Technol Rourkela Dept Comp Sci & Engn Rourkela India

ISBN: (纸本)9781665477062

Network virtualization (NV) can provide greater flexibility, better control, and improved quality of service (QoS) for the existing Internet architecture by enabling heterogeneous virtual network requests (VNRs) to share the substrate network (SN) resources. The efficient assignment of the SN resources catering to the demands of virtual machines (VMs) and virtual links (VLs) of the VNRs is known as virtual network embedding (VNE) and is proven to be NP-Hard. Deviating from the literature, this paper proposes a framework MatchVNE that is focused on maximizing the revenue-to-cost ratio of VNRs by considering a blend of system and topological attributes that better capture the inherent dependencies among the VMs. MatchVNE performs a stable VM embedding using the deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA). The preference of the VMs and servers are generated using a hybrid entropy, and the technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) based ranking strategy for VMs and servers. The attribute weights are determined using entropy, whereas the server and VM ranking are obtained via TOPSIS. The shortest path, VL-embedding, follows VM-embedding. The simulation results show that MatchVNE outperforms the baselines by achieving a 23% boost in the average revenue-to-cost-ratio and 44% improvement in the average acceptance ratio.

关键词： Network Virtualization deferred acceptance algorithm Matching Preferences TOPSIS Entropy Virtual Network Embedding

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Matching with Externalities

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REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 2023年第2期90卷 948-974页

作者： Pycia, Marek Yenmez, M. Bumin Univ Zurich Zurich Switzerland Boston Coll Chestnut Hill MA 02167 USA

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.

关键词： Matching with externalities deferred acceptance algorithm Substitutability Labour markets with couples C78 D47 D62

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When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?

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ECONOMIC THEORY 2023年第4期76卷 1145-1173页

作者： Dogan, Battal Yenmez, M. Bumin Univ Bristol Dept Econ 3B13 Priory Rd ComplexPriory Rd Clifton BS8 1TU England Boston Coll Dept Econ 140 Commonwealth Ave Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA

We study multistage centralized assignment systems to allocate scarce resources based on priorities in the context of school choice. We characterize schools' capacity-priority profiles under which an additional stage of assignment may improve student welfare when the deferred acceptance algorithm is used at each stage. If the capacity-priority profile is acyclic, then no student prefers any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of the 2-stage system to the truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage system. If the capacity-priority profile is not acyclic, then an SPNE outcome of the 2-stage system may Pareto dominate the truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage system. If students are restricted to playing truncation strategies, an additional stage unambiguously improves student welfare: no student prefers the truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage system to any SPNE outcome of the 2-stage system.

关键词： Market design Multistage assignment School choice deferred acceptance algorithm

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Intelligent Multi-connectivity Based Energy-Efficient Framework for Smart City

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JOURNAL OF NETWORK AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 2023年第3期31卷 48-48页

作者： Priya, Bhanu Malhotra, Jyoteesh Guru Nanak Dev Univ Dept Engn & Technol Reg Campus Jalandhar India

Smart city enhances the intelligence and sustainability of the city assets through advanced and diversified applications characterised by specific Quality of Service requirements. To realise the stringent requirements of these applications, multi-connectivity (MC) emerged as a potential solution that ensures seamless mobility, high reliability and enhanced data rates. However, the smart city verticals driven by the energy-constrained IoT devices experience an energy optimisation challenge in the MC configured environment. Recently, significant research has been reported in the direction of MC but they are incapacitated in terms of enhancing energy efficiency. To address the aforementioned issue, an intelligent framework based on software-defined wireless networking and edge computing has been proposed. The proposed framework leverages the synergetic integration of Double Deep Reinforcement Learning and Matching Game Theory to attain energy-efficient multi-connectivity association policy. In addition to this, the proposed approach defines the preference functions to guarantee service provisioning while respecting the radio access technologies constraints. The analytical results validated through the rigorous simulation exhibited an improvement of 45% in the overall energy efficiency. Furthermore, the proposed association scheme outperformed the other existing schemes by 12%, 27%, and 82% in terms of fairness, robustness and system satisfaction degree respectively.

关键词： Energy efficiency Multi-connectivity Smart City Matching game theory deferred acceptance algorithm Double deep reinforcement learning

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Preference estimation in centralized college admissions from reported lists

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EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS 2021年第5期61卷 2865-2911页

作者： Arslan, Hayri A. Univ Texas San Antonio One UTSA Circle San Antonio TX 78249 USA

This paper proposes a practical and data-driven preference estimation method from reported lists in a deferred acceptance mechanism when there are incentives to report these lists strategically. Data on centralized college admissions from Turkey show many pieces of evidence that students construct their lists strategically according to their admission chances and previous years' admission outcomes. We develop a preference estimation method to evaluate reported lists within the set of colleges that are considered accessible to each student. This method allows us to create personal choice sets and to estimate student preferences by making valid utility comparisons that are supported by data and theory. We show the robustness of our estimation method compared to the existing estimation methods. A counterfactual admission analysis based on our preference estimates suggests that students from low-SES households are better off under a student sorting rule only based on high school GPAs.

关键词： Preference estimation Centralized admission mechanisms deferred acceptance algorithm Admission criteria

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Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

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ECONOMIC THEORY 2021年第2期71卷 533-552页

作者： Tang, Qianfeng Zhang, Yongchao Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ Sch Econ Shanghai 200433 Peoples R China

We study the trade-off between stability and students' welfare in school choice problems. We call a matchingweakly stableif none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching-one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. A matching is said to beself-constrained efficientif for students it is not Pareto dominated by any more stable matching, and it isself-constrained optimalif it weakly Pareto dominates all such matchings. We show that the following are equivalent for any matching: (1) It is weakly stable and self-constrained efficient;(2) it is self-constrained optimal;(3) it is an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) outcome under some consenting constraints;and (4) it is exactly the EADAM outcome when its own set of blocking pairs is used as consenting constraint.

关键词： deferred acceptance algorithm Pareto efficiency School choice Stability

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Matching through institutions

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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 2020年 121卷 204-231页

作者： Bloch, Francis Cantala, David Gibaja, Damian Univ Paris 01 Paris France Paris Sch Econ Paris France Colegio Mexico Mexico City DF Mexico Univ Popular Autonoma Estado Puebla Puebla Mexico

We analyze a three-sided matching market where institutions own objects and individuals belong to institutions. Institutions pool their objects to enlarge the choice set of individuals. For any institution, the number of individuals who receive an object must be equal to the number of objects initially owned. Under this distributional constraint, individually rational and fair assignments may fail to exist. However, when the number of individuals is sufficiently large, fair assignments exist and can be found using a new algorithm, called the Nested deferred acceptance algorithm with interrupters (NDAI). This procedure nests a one-to-one matching between agents and objects and a one-to-many matching between objects and institutions. We show that it outputs a matching which is Pareto optimal among fair matchings and strategy-proof for individuals. When agents belong to several institutions, the NDAI results in assignments which are fair for agents of the same institution. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： Matching Institutions deferred acceptance algorithm Social housing

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On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 2020年 187卷 105014-105014页

作者： Rong, Kang Tang, Qianfeng Zhang, Yongchao Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ Sch Econ Shanghai 200433 Peoples R China

For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set(TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students in the set are always accepted, regardless of other students' preferences. We provide an elimination process to find the maximal TFS, if any TFS exists. We show that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS is equivalent to the associated deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the latter is a Pareto efficient mechanism. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

关键词： deferred acceptance algorithm Pareto efficiency School choice Stability Strategy-proofness

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Flexible Capacity Allocation in Smart Gateway Diversity Satellite Systems Using Matching Theory 9th

Flexible Capacity Allocation in Smart Gateway Diversity Sate...

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9th European-Alliance-for-Innovation (EAI) International Conference on Wireless and Satellite Systems (WiSATS)

作者： Roumeliotis, Anargyros J. Kourogiorgas, Charilaos I. Kyrgiazos, Argyrios Panagopoulos, Athanasios D. Natl Tech Univ Athens Athens Greece Univ Surrey Surrey England

ISBN: (纸本)9783319765716;9783319765709

In this paper, we investigate the performance of multi-beam high throughput satellite systems that employ the smart gateway diversity concept. The multi-beam satellite system is examined under the satellite system's capacity losses, the impact of the channels' atmospheric effects, the offered capacities of gateways and finally the requested capacities of users' beams. To ameliorate the system's performance, a novel flexible resource allocation algorithm is proposed which is based on the matching theory concept. Gateways and users' beams are matched according to the aforementioned factors applying the deferred acceptance algorithm. Simulation results illustrate that the proposed matching scheme outperforms a less sophisticated fixed, i.e. without resource management, allocation scheme in terms of system's capacity losses, rendering the former a very promising allocation mechanism for future satellite systems.

关键词： Smart gateway diversity Resource allocation Multi-beam satellite Matching theory deferred acceptance algorithm

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