The optional public goods game (OPGG) is a three-strategy model in which individuals can cooperate, defect, or not participate. Despite its simplicity, this model effectively captures various social dilemmas, includin...
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The optional public goods game (OPGG) is a three-strategy model in which individuals can cooperate, defect, or not participate. Despite its simplicity, this model effectively captures various social dilemmas, including those involving public services, environmental sustainability, and broader societal issues. In this study, we investigate how the reward (r) and group size of potential players (S) of public goods games influence the steady-state coexistence of these strategies or the alternation of their dominance in a rock-paper-scissors dynamic. The OPGG is simulated using Monte Carlo in a nonspatial scenario, meaning there is no topology connecting the agents, allowing any player to interact with any other player. We show that under sufficiently noisy conditions, the system consistently evolves to an absorbing state, with the prevailing strategy determined by the values of r and S. In the range 2≤r≤S, the system shows multiple stable absorbing states, with groups of size S=4 exhibiting more pronounced and transient rock-paper-scissors dynamics with longer average absorbing times. We present a thorough analysis of our results in terms of the fraction of time the system spends in rock-paper-scissor cycles, the number of cycles, and the average probability that the system relaxes to each possible absorbing state, including scenarios where the system does not reach an absorbing state at all.
The so-called Granovetter-Watts model was introduced to capture a situation in which the adoption of new ideas or technologies requires a certain redundancy in the social environment of each agent to take effect. This...
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We investigate the collective behavior of a system of social agents subject to the competition between two mass media influences considered as external fields. We study under what conditions either of two mass media w...
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We investigate the collective behavior of a system of social agents subject to the competition between two mass media influences considered as external fields. We study under what conditions either of two mass media with different intensities can impose its message to the majority. In addition to a collective state dominated by the stronger mass media and a disordered phase, we characterize two nontrivial effects as the parameters of the system are varied: (i) the appearance of a majority sharing the state of the weaker mass media, and (ii) the emergence of an alternative ordering in a state different from those of either media. We explore the dependence of both phenomena on the topology of the network of interactions. We show that the presence of long-range interactions rather than random connections is essential for the occurrence of both effects. The model can be extended to include multiple mass media and we illustrate it by considering three mass media fields acting on the system. Nontrivial collective behaviors persist for some ranges of parameters: the weakest mass media can convince the majority, and the system can spontaneously order against all applied fields.
We investigate an agent-based model for the emergence of corruption in public contracts. There are two types of agents: business people and public servants. Both business people and public servants can adopt two strat...
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We investigate the collective behavior of a system of social agents subject to the competition between two mass media influences considered as external fields. We study under what conditions either of two mass media w...
The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human...
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