A proposed cost effective alternative to current U.S. Navy structurally configured hulls is presented in this paper. This proposed design for producibility concept involves the elimination of structural stanchions and...
A proposed cost effective alternative to current U.S. Navy structurally configured hulls is presented in this paper. This proposed design for producibility concept involves the elimination of structural stanchions and transverse web frames. The potential impact of this “no frame” concept on structural design, weight and construction and material costs for naval surface frigates and destroyers is reflected in 1) reduced costs for the installation of distributive systems and 2) a reduced number and complexity of structural details providing a more reliable and less costly structure. This study was performed in three parts: 1) Determine the most feasible length between bulkheads without frames; 2) Using this length perform detail weight studies and construction and material costs analysis comparison on a 72-foot long hull module, with and without frames, for a FFG-7, and 3) Estimate the saving in man hours of labor on the installation of distributive systems and shipfitting for an FFG-7. For the feasible length studies on the “no frame” structural configuration, thirty-seven strength, weight and vertical center of gravity studies were performed on two ship classes; twenty-two on the FFG-7 class and fifteen on the DD-963 class. The detailed weight studies and construction and material cost analyses were conducted for FFG-7 “no frame” and “as built” modules. Results indicating the “no frame” concept module was 6.8% heavier and 14.8% less costly than the “as built” module. For the impact of an FFG-7 “no frame” structurally configured hull on the cost of labor required for the installation of distributive systems and for other functional work such as ship fitting, welding, and electrical, this study indicated a reduction of 169,206 labor hours per ship, representing 7.12% of the total required man hours to fabricate an FFG-7 class ship. With the employment of the “no frame” concept, certain areas of significant concern and potential risk were addressed. These include: 1) t
A research group at the Massachusetts Institute of technology has completed the first phase of the development of a computer assisted model for analyzing complex decisions and policies regarding oil spill cleanup. The...
A research group at the Massachusetts Institute of technology has completed the first phase of the development of a computer assisted model for analyzing complex decisions and policies regarding oil spill cleanup. The model is the product of an ongoing MIT Sea Grant project, sponsored by a consortium of government and industry organizations, including the National oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. C oast G uard , the U.S. N avy , the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Spill Control Association of America, JFB Scientific Corporation, the Doherty Foundation, Petro-Canada and Texaco. The model can be used, among other things, in strategic planning for the long-term oil spill response needs of a region, in assisting On Scene Coordinators in responding to a specific spill (tactical/operational setting), in evaluating the environmental and economic damages of a spill versus the cost of cleanup, in simulation and training, and in the analysis of various policy and regulatory issues such as the effects of delays, the use of dispersants and the investigation of liability and compensation issues. The paper describes the model in detail, focuses on its potential uses and presents experience with its application in conjunction with pollution control efforts of the U.S. Navy. Specifically, we outline the application of the model in the Port of Charleston, South Carolina, an ongoing project sponsored by the Naval Facilities engineering Command. The difficulty of gathering data for such an application is discussed.
The potential use of rudders as anti-roll devices has long been recognized. However, the possible interference of this secondary function of the rudder with its primary role as the steering mechanism has prevented, fo...
The potential use of rudders as anti-roll devices has long been recognized. However, the possible interference of this secondary function of the rudder with its primary role as the steering mechanism has prevented, for many years, the development of practical rudder roll stabilizers. The practical feasibility of rudder roll stabilization has, however, in recent years been demonstrated by two systems designed and developed for operational evaluation aboard two different U.S. C oast G uard Cutters, i.e., Jarvis and Mellon of the 3,000-ton, 378-foot HAMILTON Class. The authors describe the major components of the rudder roll stabilization (RRS) system, along with the design goals and methodology as applied to these first two prototypes. In addition, a brief history of the hardware development is provided in order to show some of the lessons learned. The near flawless performance of the prototypes over the past four years of operational use in the North Pacific is documented. Results from various sea trials and reports of the ship operators are cited and discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the costs and benefits of roll stabilization achieved using both a modern anti-roll fin system, as well as two different performance level RRS systems. The benefits of roll stabilization are demonstrated by the relative expansion in the operational envelopes of the USS OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Class. The varying levels of roll stabilization suggest that the merits of fins and RRS systems are strongly dependent on mission requirements and the environment. The demonstrated performance of the reliable RRS system offers the naval ship acquisition manager a good economical stabilization system.
The surface effect catamaran incorporates twin high length-to-beam cushions to support a low length-to-beam platform. The performance characteristics of the resulting vehicle, i.e., the resistance and head sea motions...
The surface effect catamaran incorporates twin high length-to-beam cushions to support a low length-to-beam platform. The performance characteristics of the resulting vehicle, i.e., the resistance and head sea motions, are equivalent to a higher length-to-beam surface effect ship. The high lateral stability which results from the widely spaced hulls and cushions of the surface effect catamaran provides several advantages not inherent in conventional surface effect ship configurations. These advantages are manifested by high cross-structure height and reduced structural loads without reduction in static or dynamic roll stability. For an 800-ton ship the widely spaced cushions provide a capability of controlling off-head sea types of motions and the virtual elimination of green water over the deck up through Sea State 6. Model tests have validated cushionborne and hullborne resistance computer prediction programs. Head sea motions tests have justified the use of high cross-structure height to minimize high slam types of structural loads. Preliminary design and model tests indicate the potential for the surface effect catamaran to operate as an open ocean ship in smaller sizes than heretofore thought possible. In addition, its planform and large volume provides pay-load capabilities of much larger ships.
作者:
RAMSAY, Ris the Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs and Shipbuilding Technology
Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA 90M) a position he has held since June 1981. Mr. Ramsay was trained as a Naval architect in England (1947–1952) with Furness Shipbuilding Company
and served with the British Army. He also holds an MSc Administration (Management Engineering) degree from George Washington University. In 1956 he was employed as a naval architect
with Davie Shipbuilding Company P. Quebec. Upon entry to the United States (1958) he served as a naval architect with the Great Lakes Engineering Works Detroit a company engaged in the design and construction of Great Lakes supercarriers. When the company was disbanded (1959) Mr. Ramsay became a member of the Chrysler Corporation engineering management staff where his responsibilities included long-range planning and oversight of the total vehicle design. When granted citizenship (1962) Mr. Ramsay elected to enter the naval ship design field and was employed by General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division (1963–1967) where he held various lead naval architect positions on projects for submarines submersibles the Fast Deployment Ship (FDLS) Surface Effect Ship (SES) and a high-speed containership. Mr. Ramsay commenced government service (1967) with the Naval Ship Engineering Center in the Ship Concept Design Division
and he also served with the Naval Sea Systems Command Submarine Logistics Division (SEA 921) as Program Management PERA (SS) and Project Manager SSN 637 Class Submarines. In 1975 he transferred to the Auxiliary and Special Mission Ship Acquisition Project (PMS 383) to gain ship acquisition experience with the ASR 21 Class and the T-ARC 7. Prior to selection for his present position Mr. Ramsay was assigned to the Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) Office of Ocean Engineering as Technical Manager for the Development of an Oceanlab research submarine. Other duties were permformed as a Science Systems Analyst responsible fo
This paper provides an overview of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry vitality, and its past and present capability to support new ship construction programs in the national interest. The capabilities of the sh...
This paper provides an overview of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry vitality, and its past and present capability to support new ship construction programs in the national interest. The capabilities of the shipbuilding industrial base are also examined at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of supplier support in relation to an expanded naval shipbuilding program. The aspects of technological improvements and the humane use of human beings, in the ship production process, are discussed with particular reference to the workforce management practices in foreign countries. An optimistic conclusion provides a prognosis regarding the prosecution of expanded naval shipbuilding programs within the capacity and capability of the U.S. industry.
The structural design of a ship's section is a complicated, repetitive and time consuming task. With the advent of new technology, high speed computers have enabled the ship designer to accomplish in a matter of s...
The structural design of a ship's section is a complicated, repetitive and time consuming task. With the advent of new technology, high speed computers have enabled the ship designer to accomplish in a matter of seconds what would formerly take days to accomplish by hand. The Structural Synthesis Design program (SSDP) is a N avy developed computer-aided design tool which is used to design (or to analyze) the longitudinal scantlings for a variety of ship cross sections, consisting of any practical combinations of decks, platforms, bulkheads and materials, i.e., various steel and aluminum alloys. The final hull section design will have the lowest practical weight for the chosen geometric configuration, structural arrangements, and imposed loadings. The scantling developed by the program will satisfy all U.S. N avy ship structural design criteria. An explanation of the objective and design elements of N avy ship structures is included. The rationale behind the SSDP design philosophy is developed along with the significant program capabilities. In an attempt to highlight the influence of automated design procedures on the current naval ship design process, the effect of the SSDP on the DDG 51 destroyer structural development is addressed.
作者:
KEHOE, JAMES W.BROWER, KENNETH S.MEIER, HERBERT A.RUNNERSTROM, CDR. ERICJames W. Kehoe
Jr. is well known for his work in conducting comparative naval architecture studies of U.S. and foreign warship design practices for which he received the ASNE Gold Medal for 1981 and the Legion of Merit. He is currently a partner in Spectrum Associates Incorporated Arlington Virginia where he is engaged in the feasibility and concept design of naval ships and in continuing his comparative engineering analyses of U.S. and foreign warships. Prior to his retirement from the U.S. Navy as a Captain in 1982 his naval career involved sea duty aboard three destroyers and three aircraft carriers including command of the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753) and engineer officer of the USS Wasp (CVS-18). Ashore he had duty at the Naval Sea Systems Command where he directed the Comparative Naval Architecture Program as an instructor in project managementin the Polaris missile projectand as a nuclear weapons officer. He holds a B.S. in mathematics from Stonehill College
Massachusetts (1952) and an MA in education from San Diego State College (1959). A frequent contributor to the Naval Engineers Journal U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and the International Defense Review he has published a number of articles on U.S. Soviet and other foreign warship design practices and the effects of design practices on ship size and cost. Kenneth S. Brower is a partner in Spectrum Associates Incorporated
Arlington Virginia which he founded in June 1978. He graduated from the University of Michigan in 1965 with a Bachelor's Degree in Naval Architecture. Mr. Brower has contributed to the design and construction of numerous merchant ships and warships the latter of which include the CG-47 project Arapaho the FDL and DX projects the new NATO Frigates Replacement for the ‘90's DDGX and FFX projects as well as several frigate developed for Foreign Military Sales. Since 1972 he has actively supported the Naval Sea Systems Command's Comparative Naval Architecture Program. During this period Mr. Brower has contribute
There are two principal benefits to conducting comparative engineering analyses of U.S. and foreign ship design practices and criteria: 1) they offer an opportunity to identify clever ideas from which the U.S. can ben...
There are two principal benefits to conducting comparative engineering analyses of U.S. and foreign ship design practices and criteria: 1) they offer an opportunity to identify clever ideas from which the U.S. can benefit, and 2) they cause us to assess U.S. design practices critically that we may have been taking for granted or may have been accepting as inviolable. The results of a comparative analysis of U.S. and foreign hull form, machinery, and structural design practices are reported in this paper. Numerous studies of U.S. and foreign warships have shown that the hull form, machinery, and structural design practices of various navies differ considerably. Although most large navies operate their ships in generally similar environments, each country has developed its own unique style of hull form. Based on an assessment of foreign hull form design practices, the U.S. Navy has recently developed a style of hull form that offers improved stability and seakeeping performance and which facilitates the arrangement of internal functions. Foreign ships generally have a tighter machinery arrangement than comparable U.S. ships. However, this is not necessarily achieved by accepting less subsystem performance or by sacrificing redundancy. The tightness of foreign machinery plants seems to be achieved by tighter management control over the ship design and acquisition process. In addition, foreign navies appear to be more flexible in adjusting to a new technology such as that which occurred during the change from steam to gas turbine propulsion. U.S. ships appear to be constructed to more rigorous structural detail design standards than foreign ships. The structural configuration of foreign ships, including the integration of web frames, longitudinal girders, and stanchions also differs from U.S. practice. The configuration of ship structure and the value of rigorous U.S. structural design practices are worthy of additional research. The results of the study reported in thi
作者:
LIBERATORE, DJBASKERVILLE, JELCdr. Donald J. Liberatore
USN: began his career in the U.S. Navy in 1965. He has had many diverse assignments involving surface ships and submarines during the past seventeen years. During his tour at Naval Shipyard Portsmouth (N.H.) he was Assistant Design Superintendent and responsible for the introduction of Heat Recoverable Coupling technology into the shipyard. Presently he is assigned to the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in the Sonar Dome Office. Prior assignments within NAVSEA have been as Assistant Ship Systems Design Manager for the SSNX and FA-SSN preliminary designs in the Submarine Propulsion Analysis Branchin the Submarine Hydrodynamics Branchand in the Gear
Coupling and Clutch Branch. He received his Bachelor of Engineering degree from Vanderbilt University in 1971 and in 1977 graduated from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with his M.S. degree in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering and his Professional degree of Ocean Engineer. A member of ASNE since 1975 LCdr. Liberatore also is a member of IEEE SNAME the Naval Institute and Sigma Xi. Cdr. James E. Baskerville
USN: is presently assigned to NAVSEA as the Ship Manager for the DDG 51 the Navy's next generation surface combatant. In a previous tour at Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor he was the Navy's Program Manager for Heat Recoverable Coupling introduction in ship repair and maintenance. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1969 he is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer and a designated Engineering Duty Officer (ED). He received his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and his Professional degree of Ocean Engineer from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also holds a patent right on an Electronic Control and Response System. His naval assignments have included tours in the USS Ramey (FFG-2) as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the Commander
Naval Electronic Systems Command and as Ship Superintendent
Surface Type Desk Officer and Assistant Design Superintendent at Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor. Cdr. Baskervi
Although Heat Recoverable Couplings (HRCs), used to join pipe, may be labeled innovative “state-of-the-art” technology for U.S. Naval Shipyards, they have been in use in foreign ships and high technology industries ...
Although Heat Recoverable Couplings (HRCs), used to join pipe, may be labeled innovative “state-of-the-art” technology for U.S. Naval Shipyards, they have been in use in foreign ships and high technology industries for over a decade. HRCs provide a permanent leak-proof pipe joint in specified applications without the use of high temperature and the inherent hazards of an open flame. Manufactured from NITINOL, a nickel-titanium alloy developed by the U.S. Navy, the couplings exhibit a “shape memory” characteristic. That is, they return (shrink) to a specified shape (pipe diameter) thus forming a mechanical seal when the expanded coupling is removed from a cryogenic environment and warmed above approximately —130°C. This paper provides background information into the development of NITINOL, technical explanation of shape memory metallurgy, and a summary of results, with specific examples, describing the trial use of HRCs at Pearl Harbor and Norfolk Naval Shipyards. Limited return cost data and recommendations for future use are presented. Then, using the HRC program as a basis, the Authors discuss the conservative nature of the ship repair and maintenance environment. This environment, in the Authors' opinion, couples with complex contractual constraints and requirements which serve to restrict the introduction of new ideas. An analogy is made to Russian tenacity of recent years which promotes “exploring and doing” while we in the U.S. Navy are frequently content to study.
The on-going debate regarding the merits of large versus small aircraft carriers raises several issues concerning the ability of various ship configurations to support sea based air operations. One such issue is the q...
The on-going debate regarding the merits of large versus small aircraft carriers raises several issues concerning the ability of various ship configurations to support sea based air operations. One such issue is the question of the relative seakeeping performance of ship alternatives. In an effort to shed some light on the matter, a comparative seakeeping assessment of nine air capable ships covering a wide range of size and hull form was performed. An evaluation of the impact of aircraft and ship motion limitations on sea based air operations and a comparison of the relative ability of the ships to conduct air operations while in a seaway are presented. The specific air operations considered are launch, recovery, and support of aircraft. The ships evaluated are CVN-71, CVA-67 (MR), CVV, LHA-1, VSS-D, DDV-2, DDV-1D, DD-963, and SWATH-6. These ships have the combined capability to operate Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL), Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL), Short Takeoff and Arrested Landing (STOAL), and Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) type aircraft. Results indicate that seakeeping performance generally degrades with decreasing displacement, that SWATH-6 performance is the least degraded, that elevator wetness can be an important degrader for ships with lower freeboards, that roll motion can be an important degrader for ships under 60,000 tons, and that percent time of operation is strongly dependent on the prevailing wave and wind environment.
作者:
WOODRUFF, RBThe authorgraduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with distinction in 1964. He served initially in theUSS Davis (DD-937)as Main Propulsion Assistant
attended the Naval Destroyer School and then was a member of the Pre-Commissioning Crew and Engineer Officer in theUSS Julius A. Furer (DEG-6).Selected as an Engineering Duty Officer (ED) in 1968 he had a tour in the Maintenance Department Staff of Commander Cruisr-Destroyer Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet at Newport R.I. after which he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate studies which culminated in his receiving his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and his degree of Ocean Engineer in 1972. Following graduation he was assigned to the Boston Naval Shipyard followed by two years in theUSS Puget Sound (AD-38)as Repair Officer after which he was ordered to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard as the Production Engineering Officer. Currently he is on duty in the Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 399) where he is the Trials Officer and Hull Technical Director for theOliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)Class Acquisition Program. Cdr. Woodruff is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer and among his military decorations holds the Naval Achievement Medal and the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Citation Gallantry Cross. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1967 he is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute. Two previous papers on Naval Shipyard Production presented at ASNE Day 1978 and 1979 were published in the Naval Engineers Journal Vol. 90 No. 2 (April 1978) and Vol. 91 No. 2 (April 1979). A paper on the Management of Surface Ship Maintenance was published in theNaval Engineers JournalDecember 1980.
This paper describes the impact made on the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class design after numerous trials by the President, Board of Inspection and Survey and his Staff. In the early 1970s, faced with a Fleet of Worl...
This paper describes the impact made on the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class design after numerous trials by the President, Board of Inspection and Survey and his Staff. In the early 1970s, faced with a Fleet of World War II Destroyers, the Navy embarked on a program to build large numbers of Frigates to perform an ocean Escort role. This ship had three major design constraints placed on it by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO): fixed meaning, fixed displacement, and fixed cost or “designed to cost.” The purpose of this paper is to pass on some “lessons learned.” The acid test of any ship design is how well it does with the Fleet in regard to performance and reliability. How well has the “design-constrained” FFG-7 fared with 20 plus ship trials under its belt? Very well in some areas; not so well in others. Examples of the good aspects of this ship design (LM 2500 and main propulsion train, Standard Option Equipment, et cetera) as well as those which must be considered poor will be addressed. Some examples of the latter are the “breezeway” cargo doors, ship's service diesel generators, MK 92 Combat Systems, decontamination stations, and topside corrosion control. In many cases INSURV caused design changes to be made that were sorely needed; in other cases, changes were made (or not made) over issues that had little or no impact on making this ship more ready for war. A brief examination of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) surface ship design policies is made from the point of view of the Trials Officer (the Author) who rode most of the trials with PRESINSURV. Some of the issues addressed: •Improved NAVSEA corporate memory between ship designs. •Longer Acceptance Trial for Lead Ship. •Early deployment of Lead Ship without TECHREPS. •Improved NAVSEA/INSURV/CNO communication on Trial/Technical Issues and insertion of INSURV early into the design process. •Need for NAVSEA to stand up and say “no” to costly design changes that do little to make for a better warship.
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