Quantum Conference Key Agreement (CKA) is a cryptographic effort of multiple parties to establish a shared secret key. While bipartite quantum key distribution protocols are also useful in the context of CKA, multipar...
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We live in an era of information and it is very important to handle the exchange of information. While sending data to an authorized source, we need to protect it from unauthorized sources, changes, and authentication...
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Many online social networking platforms are leveraging crowdsourcing to enhance the user experience. These platforms seek to incentivize heterogeneous workers to exert efforts to complete tasks (e.g., evaluation of po...
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ISBN:
(数字)9781728109626
ISBN:
(纸本)9781728109633
Many online social networking platforms are leveraging crowdsourcing to enhance the user experience. These platforms seek to incentivize heterogeneous workers to exert efforts to complete tasks (e.g., evaluation of posts and articles) and truthfully report their solutions. An output agreement mechanism (e.g., majority voting) is a common approach to this end. In an output agreement mechanism, a worker is rewarded according to whether his solution matches those of his peers. However, prior related work has not considered workers with heterogeneous solution accuracy and how this heterogeneity affects a platform's payoff. We fill this void by modeling and analyzing the interactions between a platform and workers as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the platform chooses the reward level for the majority voting to maximize its payoff. In Stage II, the workers decide their effort levels and reporting strategies to maximize their payoffs. We show that as a worker's solution accuracy increases, he is more likely to exert effort and truthfully report his solution at the equilibrium. However, given a fixed worker population, it is surprising that the platform's payoff does not monotonically increase in the number of high-accuracy workers. This is because a larger number of high-accuracy workers brings marginally decreasing benefit to the platform, but the rewards required to incentivize them may significantly grow. Moreover, we show that as the solutions of the high-accuracy workers become more accurate, the platform needs a smaller number of such workers to achieve the maximum payoff.
Personal health records (PHRs) are valuable assets to individuals because they enable them to integrate and manage their medical data. A PHR is an electronic application through which patients can manage their health ...
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In this paper we consider solving saddle point problems using two variants of Gradient Descent- Ascent algorithms, Extra-gradient (EG) and Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent (OGDA) methods. We show that both of these ...
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We study the iteration complexity of the optimistic gradient descent-ascent (OGDA) method and the extra-gradient (EG) method for finding a saddle point of a convex-convex uncon- strained min-max problem. To do so, we ...
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This paper studies a strategic model of marketing and product diffusion in social networks. We consider two firms offering substitutable products which can improve their market share by seeding the key individuals in ...
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This tutorial article describes a dynamical systems framework rooted in evolutionary game principles to characterize non-cooperative strategic interactions among large populations of bounded rationality agents. It als...
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ISBN:
(数字)9781728113982
ISBN:
(纸本)9781728113999
This tutorial article describes a dynamical systems framework rooted in evolutionary game principles to characterize non-cooperative strategic interactions among large populations of bounded rationality agents. It also overviews recent results that use passivity notions to characterize the stability of Nash-like equilibria. In our framework, each agent belongs to a population that prescribes to its members a strategy set and a strategy revision protocol. A so-called social state registers the proportions of agents in every population adopting each strategy and a pre-selected dynamic payoff mechanism, specified by a payoff dynamics model (PDM), determines the payoff as a causal map of the social state. According to the framework, each agent must take up a strategy at a time, which it can repeatedly revise over time based on its current strategy, and information about the payoff and social state available to it. The PDM class considered in our framework can model precisely or approximately prevalent dynamic behaviors such as inertia and delays that are inherent to learning and network effects, which cannot be captured using conventional memoryless payoff mechanisms (often referred to as population games).We organize the article in two main parts. The first introduces basic concepts prevailing in existing approaches in which a population game determines the payoff, while the second considers rather general PDM classes, of which every population game is a particular case. The latter expounds a passivity-based methodology to characterize convergence of the social state to Nash-like equilibria.
In this paper, we propose a drone-based wildfire monitoring system for remote and hard-to-reach areas. This system utilizes autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with the main advantage of providing on-demand mon...
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In this paper, we propose a drone-based wildfire monitoring system for remote and hard-to-reach areas. This system utilizes autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with the main advantage of providing on-demand monitoring service faster than the current approaches of using satellite images, manned aircraft and remotely controlled drones. Furthermore, using autonomous drones facilitates minimizing human intervention in risky wildfire zones. In particular, to develop a fully autonomous system, we propose a distributed leader-follower coalition formation model to cluster a set of drones into multiple coalitions that collectively cover the designated monitoring field. The coalition leader is a drone that employs observer drones potentially with different sensing and imaging capabilities to hover in circular paths and collect imagery information from the impacted areas. The objectives of the proposed system include: i) to cover the entire fire zone with a minimum number of drones, and ii) to minimize the energy consumption and latency of the available drones to fly to the fire zone. Simulation results confirm that the performance of the proposed system- without the need for inter-coalition communications- approaches that of a centrally-optimized system.
This paper deals with determining all the loop gain and delay regions for closed-loop stability of a multivariable system. Such a problem admits no analytical solutions in general. Instead, we graphically determine st...
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