In this paper,we consider revenue sharing and franchise fees as coordination mechanisms in a supply chain system consisting of a supplier and a buyer with price-sensitive *** problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg Game ...
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In this paper,we consider revenue sharing and franchise fees as coordination mechanisms in a supply chain system consisting of a supplier and a buyer with price-sensitive *** problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg Game in which the retailer acts as the leader by announcing his revenue share that he has chosen in advance,and the supplier acts as the follower by determining production retail price and thus delivery quantity for his product is *** such consignment relationship,the supplier retains ownership of the *** use of game theoretic analytical method,we compare the revenue sharing contract that the retailer gives to the supplier when they work jointly with that when they work *** is shown that revenue sharing is not sufficient to guarantee the system's profit *** charging the retailer franchise fees to offset an amount equal to or more than his losses due to the decrease of his revenue share based on channel revenue *** then shows that the mechanism of employing revenue sharing and franchise fees can achieve channel perfect coordination when demand is price-sensitive,meanwhile,the channel profits and individual profits achieved by employing revenue sharing and franchise fees are both larger than those achieved when they are decentralized ***,the numerical examples and simulation analysis are provided,which indicates the feasibility of the coordination mechanisms.
This paper established an improved optimization model of distribution vehicle scheduling based on Stranger Problem, which the common vehicle scheduling model does not consider, by defining two parameters named Strange...
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This paper established an improved optimization model of distribution vehicle scheduling based on Stranger Problem, which the common vehicle scheduling model does not consider, by defining two parameters named Strange Degree and Strange Coefficient. In the end the paper makes on experimental computation by using improved C W algorithm. The computational results prove the feasibility and efficiency of the improved optimization model.
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