The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or “80-20 rule.” How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public c...
详细信息
The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or “80-20 rule.” How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public cooperation, when individuals, the rich and the poor, engage in a collective-risk enterprise, not to gain a profit but to avoid a potential loss? Here we address this issue by studying a simple but effective model based on threshold public goods games. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics for two distinct scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers versus defectors and the other with altruists versus defectors. For both scenarios, particularly, we in detail study the dynamics of the population with dichotomic initial wealth—the rich versus the poor. Moreover, we demonstrate the possible steady compositions of the population and provide the conditions for stability of these steady states. We prove that in a population with heterogeneous wealth distribution, richer individuals are more likely to cooperate than poorer ones. Participants with lower initial wealth may choose to cooperate only if all players richer than them are cooperators. The emergence of pubic cooperation largely relies on rich individuals. Furthermore, whenever the wealth gap between the rich and the poor is sufficiently large, cooperation of a few rich individuals can substantially elevate the overall level of social cooperation, which is in line with the well-known Pareto principle. Our work may offer an insight into the emergence of cooperative behavior in real social situations where heterogeneous distribution of wealth among individual is omnipresent.
The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods gam...
详细信息
The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations. The theory of stochastic process is innovatively adopted to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the public goods games involving a diversity of contributions. In the limit of rare mutations, the general stationary distribution of this stochastic process can be analytically approximated by means of diffusion theory. Moreover, we demonstrate that increasing the diversity of contributions greatly reduces the probability of finding the population in a homogeneous state full of defectors. This increase also raises the expectation of the total contribution in the entire population and thus promotes social cooperation. Furthermore, by investigating the evolutionary dynamics of optional public goods games with diverse contributions, we find that nonparticipation can assist players who contribute more in resisting invasion and taking over individuals who contribute less. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to confirm our analytical results. Our results may provide insight into the effect of diverse contributions on cooperative behaviors in the real world.
The problem on stabilization for the system with distributed delays is researched. The distributed time-delay under consideration is assumed to be a constant time-delay, but not known exactly. A design method is propo...
详细信息
The problem on stabilization for the system with distributed delays is researched. The distributed time-delay under consideration is assumed to be a constant time-delay, but not known exactly. A design method is proposed for a memory proportional and integral (PI) feedback controller with adaptation to distributed time-delay. The feedback controller with memory simultaneously contains the current state and the past distributed information of the addressed systems. The design for adaptation law to distributed delay is very concise. The controller can be derived by solving a set of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Two numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the design method.
Multispectral bioluminescence tomography is becoming a promising tool because it can resolve the biodistibution of bioluminescent reporters associated with cellular and subcellular function through several millimeters...
详细信息
Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently, it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary gam...
详细信息
Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently, it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game dynamics, the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the performance in a game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both unstructured and structured populations, a key assumption allowing analytical calculations is weak selection, which means that all individuals perform approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average fixation time not only up to linear but also up to higher orders in selection intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling of the selection intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which violate (linear) weak selection results, such as the one-third rule of coordination games in finite but large populations.
This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in...
详细信息
This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.
We investigate the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game on small-world networks in a realistic social context where individuals consider their local contributions to their group and update their ...
详细信息
We investigate the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game on small-world networks in a realistic social context where individuals consider their local contributions to their group and update their strategies by self-questioning. An individual with introspection can determine whether its current strategy is superior by playing a virtual round of the game and its local contribution is defined as the sum of all the payoffs its neighbors collect against it. In our model, the performance of an individual is determined by both its payoff and local contribution through a linear combination. We demonstrate that the present mechanism can produce very robust cooperative behavior in both games. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis based on mean-field approximation, and find that the analytical predictions are qualitatively consistent with the simulation results.
We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive deg...
详细信息
We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive degree correlation can either promote or inhibit the emergence of cooperation depending on network configurations. Furthermore, we investigate the probability to cooperate as a function of connectivity degree, and find that high-degree individuals generally have a higher tendency to cooperate. Finally, it is found that small-degree individuals usually change their strategy more frequently, and such change is shown to be unfavourable to cooperation for both kinds of networks.
The evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game is investigated under different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on scale-free networks with a tunable clustering coefficient. It is found that, on the o...
详细信息
The evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game is investigated under different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on scale-free networks with a tunable clustering coefficient. It is found that, on the one hand, cooperation can be enhanced with the increasing clustering coefficient when only the most connected nodes are occupied by cooperators initially. On the other hand, if cooperators just occupy the lowest-degree nodes at the beginning, then the higher the value of the clustering coefficient, the more unfavorable the environment for cooperators to survive for the increment of temptation to defect. Thereafter, we analytically argue these nontrivial phenomena by calculating the cooperation probability of the nodes with different degrees in the steady state, and obtain the critical values of initial frequency of cooperators below which cooperators would vanish finally for the two initial distributions.
An adaptive threshold segmentation algorithm based on HS joint statistics using HSI color model is introduced in order to improve the performance of image segmentation and the robustness of object recognition to illum...
详细信息
An adaptive threshold segmentation algorithm based on HS joint statistics using HSI color model is introduced in order to improve the performance of image segmentation and the robustness of object recognition to illumination change. Statistics of H and S component value of all the pixels in the region of interest (ROI) is obtained after image segmentation in HSI color space. The changing rule of statistics is verified while an empirical scale factor is applied to reflect the difference between the influence of H value and S value on segmentation threshold. The threshold is thus adjusted online according to the proposed approach. Experimental results demonstrate the decrease trend of H and S component value with intensified light. Furthermore, it validates the robustness of the approach under the circumstance of changing illumination. Thus the accuracy of the vision-based robot grasping is significantly improved.
暂无评论