The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or “80-20 rule.” How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public c...
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The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or “80-20 rule.” How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public cooperation, when individuals, the rich and the poor, engage in a collective-risk enterprise, not to gain a profit but to avoid a potential loss? Here we address this issue by studying a simple but effective model based on threshold public goods games. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics for two distinct scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers versus defectors and the other with altruists versus defectors. For both scenarios, particularly, we in detail study the dynamics of the population with dichotomic initial wealth—the rich versus the poor. Moreover, we demonstrate the possible steady compositions of the population and provide the conditions for stability of these steady states. We prove that in a population with heterogeneous wealth distribution, richer individuals are more likely to cooperate than poorer ones. Participants with lower initial wealth may choose to cooperate only if all players richer than them are cooperators. The emergence of pubic cooperation largely relies on rich individuals. Furthermore, whenever the wealth gap between the rich and the poor is sufficiently large, cooperation of a few rich individuals can substantially elevate the overall level of social cooperation, which is in line with the well-known Pareto principle. Our work may offer an insight into the emergence of cooperative behavior in real social situations where heterogeneous distribution of wealth among individual is omnipresent.
International negotiations of reducing CO2 emissions address the question of how to account annual CO2 emissions of each sector of one city. The aim of this study is to establish the CO2 inventories focused on the sup...
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International negotiations of reducing CO2 emissions address the question of how to account annual CO2 emissions of each sector of one city. The aim of this study is to establish the CO2 inventories focused on the supply chain emissions of CO2 emissions form each sector, e.g. agriculture, industry, transportation and tertiary industry. And to categorize upstream emission sources to identify the significant sectors that contribute the most to climate change. Moreover, IO-LCA method is chosen to evaluate the upstream carbon footprint and carbon dioxide emissions intensity of 28 economic sectors of Chongqing from 2002 to 2007. CO2 emissions the top-3 of which includes Transportation Equipment, Smelting and Pressing of Metals, Electricity, Steam Production and Supply, and CO2 emissions density the top-3 of which includes Coal Mining and Dressing, Nonmetal Minerals Mining and Dressing, Petroleum, Coking and Nuclear Fuel Processing.
The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods gam...
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The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations. The theory of stochastic process is innovatively adopted to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the public goods games involving a diversity of contributions. In the limit of rare mutations, the general stationary distribution of this stochastic process can be analytically approximated by means of diffusion theory. Moreover, we demonstrate that increasing the diversity of contributions greatly reduces the probability of finding the population in a homogeneous state full of defectors. This increase also raises the expectation of the total contribution in the entire population and thus promotes social cooperation. Furthermore, by investigating the evolutionary dynamics of optional public goods games with diverse contributions, we find that nonparticipation can assist players who contribute more in resisting invasion and taking over individuals who contribute less. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to confirm our analytical results. Our results may provide insight into the effect of diverse contributions on cooperative behaviors in the real world.
The problem on stabilization for the system with distributed delays is researched. The distributed time-delay under consideration is assumed to be a constant time-delay, but not known exactly. A design method is propo...
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The problem on stabilization for the system with distributed delays is researched. The distributed time-delay under consideration is assumed to be a constant time-delay, but not known exactly. A design method is proposed for a memory proportional and integral (PI) feedback controller with adaptation to distributed time-delay. The feedback controller with memory simultaneously contains the current state and the past distributed information of the addressed systems. The design for adaptation law to distributed delay is very concise. The controller can be derived by solving a set of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Two numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the design method.
Multispectral bioluminescence tomography is becoming a promising tool because it can resolve the biodistibution of bioluminescent reporters associated with cellular and subcellular function through several millimeters...
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Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently, it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary gam...
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Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently, it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game dynamics, the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the performance in a game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both unstructured and structured populations, a key assumption allowing analytical calculations is weak selection, which means that all individuals perform approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average fixation time not only up to linear but also up to higher orders in selection intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling of the selection intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which violate (linear) weak selection results, such as the one-third rule of coordination games in finite but large populations.
Multi-targets video tracking theory is introduced briefly, and the structured Branching MHT algorithm is applied in Multi-targets video tracking system. Connected with Kalman filter, hypotheses are built by SB/MHT usi...
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ISBN:
(纸本)9787894631046
Multi-targets video tracking theory is introduced briefly, and the structured Branching MHT algorithm is applied in Multi-targets video tracking system. Connected with Kalman filter, hypotheses are built by SB/MHT using measures which are stretched by Bhattacharyya coefficient. In this way, Multi-targets video tracking can carry out. Feasibility of this method is validated by simulation.
This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in...
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This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.
We investigate the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game on small-world networks in a realistic social context where individuals consider their local contributions to their group and update their ...
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We investigate the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game on small-world networks in a realistic social context where individuals consider their local contributions to their group and update their strategies by self-questioning. An individual with introspection can determine whether its current strategy is superior by playing a virtual round of the game and its local contribution is defined as the sum of all the payoffs its neighbors collect against it. In our model, the performance of an individual is determined by both its payoff and local contribution through a linear combination. We demonstrate that the present mechanism can produce very robust cooperative behavior in both games. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis based on mean-field approximation, and find that the analytical predictions are qualitatively consistent with the simulation results.
We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive deg...
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We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive degree correlation can either promote or inhibit the emergence of cooperation depending on network configurations. Furthermore, we investigate the probability to cooperate as a function of connectivity degree, and find that high-degree individuals generally have a higher tendency to cooperate. Finally, it is found that small-degree individuals usually change their strategy more frequently, and such change is shown to be unfavourable to cooperation for both kinds of networks.
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