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THE APPLICATION OF A PLANNING CONTRACT CONCEPT TO A COMPLEX NAVY SURFACE SHIP OVERHAUL

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1983年第2期95卷 51-65页

作者： NODELL, WR SIAS, PM William R. Nodell USCG (Ret.):graduated from the U. S. COAST GUARD Academy in 1950 receiving a B.S. degree and earned his Master of Sciences and Naval Engineer degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1957. He has served in various line and engineering capacities on board COAST GUARD Cutters in Atlantic Pacific and Alaskan waters. He served in the production department of the COAST GUARD Yard in Curtis Bay Maryland and later was Chief of the Naval Engineering Branches of the 13th COAST GUARD District in Seattle Washington and the 3rd COAST GUARD District New York New York. After retirement he held a position as Manager of the Marine Engineering Department at Atlantic Research Corporation Costa Mesa California and joined Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company in 1973. He was Project Engineer for the Polar Class Icebreakers the AS-41 and the LSD-41 in various stages. He has contributed technical papers to several professional societies. He is currently a member of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers the American Society of Naval Engineers where he served as a past chairman of the Puget Sound Chapter and the National Management Association where he served as a Past President of the local chapter. He is a senior systems engineer at Lockheed. Peter M. Sias:received his B.S. degree in Marine Engineering from Maine Maritime Academy in 1950. Subsequently he completed a NAVY sponsored program in Naval Architecture at the University of California and Department of Defense courses in program management and contract administration at the Air Force Institute of Technology. He served on active duty with the United States Navy during the Korean emergency with assignments as Engineering Officer for a minesweeper and collateral staff duty assignments with the Commander Mineforce U.S. Pacific Fleet for reserve ship activation. Upon release from active duty in 1952 he joined United States Steel Corporation as an Industrial Engineer. In 1955 he accepted a position in the Eng

Early in 1979, the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet requested that alternate procedures be explored for overhaul of the USS Sacramento (AOE-1). Of particular concern was the availability of the ship to accomplish alterations and repair planning prior to the start of the overhaul and the history of AOE Class ships not being completed in the private sector within the scheduled availability time. The planning type contract concept wherein pre-overhaul tests and inspections, preparation of drawings, procurement of long lead time material and detailed overhauling planning and scheduling would be accomplished by the successful Contractor was one approach requested for major consideration. In July 1979, the decision was made to proceed with the planning contract concept for overhaul of the USS Sacramento. The Request for Proposals (RFP's) were issued to industry in November 1979 with contract award to Lockheed Ship building and Construction Company (LSCC) on 4 February 1980. In September 1980, the overhaul for USS Sacramento was classified by the Navy as “complex”, confirming specific management action and attention to be given during the planning and overhaul phases. This technical paper describes the application of the planning contract concept to the planning and overhaul of USS Sacramento. Actual experiences including issue of the negotiated Request for Proposals (RFP's), performing pre-overhaul test and inspections (POT & I) procedures, accomplishing ship check and drawing preparation, and scheduling, including proper phasing of all elements and critical path analysis, will be reviewed in detail. Comparisons to conventional procedures will be made, along with concepts for modifying the methods employed to custom fit the characteristics of future overhauls. The closure will include a summary of “lessons learned” to date with specific recommendations for application of procedures to future overhauls.

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THE SYSTEM engineering ANALYSIS - A STRUCTURED APPROACH FOR IMPROVING SHIP MAINTENANCE

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1982年第2期94卷 118-126页

作者： BEYERS, CP The authoris a member of the technical staff in the Ships Systems Program of ARINC Research Corporation's Ships and Ordnance Division. He is currently applying the System Engineering Analysis (SEA) methodology to systems installed on auxiliary class ships. He is the coauthor ofAmphibious Ship Engineering Operating Cycle (PEOC) Program Engineering Analysis Requirements which documents the SEA methodology. He has been instrumental in the development and improvement of the procedures and analytical techniques for the SEA methodology and the application of those procedures and techniques in the analyses of various ship systems and equipments. He has applied the SEA methodology to propulsion plant systems and equipments auxiliary systems and equipments and some electronic systems and equipments for the FF 1052 DDG 37 CG 16 CG 26 DD 963 AOE 1 AFS 1 and AOR 1 Classes. Prior to joining ARINC Research Mr. Beyers was responsible for test program development and data analysis for wind tunnel temperature testing of cars at Chrysler Corporation. He also solved mechanical and production problems with shock absorbers affecting car ride shock absorber life and parts costs. Mr. Beyers received his BS in Engineering from Oakland University (Rochester Michigan) in 1972.

This paper describes the System engineering Analysis (SEA), a methodology developed to objectively define and improve ship maintenance using Navy historical maintenance data. The methodology is based on the analysis of recurring failures and maintenance actions as exhibited in the maintenance data and the use of reliability-centered maintenance concepts for defining maintenance requirements. Failure modes and effects analyses (FMEAs) are limited to historically recurring failures; FMEAs are not conducted for all possible failure modes because of the likelihood of limited payback coupled with increased analysis cost. Results of a SEA provide (1) information for the Class Maintenance Plan, which defines the intermediate and depot-level maintenance requirements for a ship class, and (2) supporting information for the design review process and for improvements in the integrated logistics support of the selected system or equipment. The SEA also recommends design studies, design improvements, and maintenance strategy and support improvements.

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NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS systems CONTROL-SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1982年第3期94卷 153-159页

作者： CORNETT, PC The authorat FMC Corporation Northern Ordnance Division (FMC/NOD) has the dual responsibility of Manager of Design Assurance and Project Manager of the new Vertical Load Gun Family (VLGF). He received his BSEE degree from Colorado State University in 1962 and his MSEE degree from the University of Minnesota in 1969. As the Design Assurance Manager at FMC/NOD he is responsible for the areas of: Product Evaluation Human Factors and System Studies Reliability Maintainability and Availability Engineering Standards and Controls and Engineering Test. As Project Manager for the VLGF he has full responsibility for all aspects of the new gun development program. From 1964 to 1979 Mr. Cornett was Senior Project Engineer at FMC/NOD. During this period he was responsible for the development design production and test of electronic control systems for several of the Gun Mounts and Guided Missile Launching Systems produced at FMC/NOD. From 1962 to 1964 he was with Sperry Utah Company as cognizant engineer for an electronic assembly in the Sergeant Missile Launcher. Mr. Cornett has applied for a patent for a velocimeter for measuring projectile muzzle velocity. He is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

The Missile Launching Control System of the Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) Mark 13 Mod 4 is being modified to improve troubleshooting and maintenance, and a training system has been developed to improve training techniques for the operation of the GMLS Mk 13 Mod 4. The improved training technique is the Launcher Maintenance Operational Training System (LMOTS) which allows the technician to get operational and troubleshooting training at the control panel without the need for an actual launcher attached to that control panel. The launcher is replaced by a Launcher Order Responder Unit (LORU) which simulates the actions of the launcher and the possible failures which may occur within the launcher system. An improved troubleshooting technique for the GMLS Mk 13 Mod 4 is accomplished through the use of Built-In Test Equipment (BITE). The BITE lets the technician identify and troubleshoot problem areas by means of a keyboard/display and the schematic diagrams. In the future, the On-Line Monitor (OLM), may actually do the troubleshooting for the technician. The OLM continuously monitors the system and notifies the technican of any problems via a code on the display. Future technology may also include a redundant microcomputer-based control system which, due to the redundancy, could require little or no unscheduled maintenance. This system, as with the previous system described, is dedicated to increasing the efficiency of troubleshooting the GMLS's control system and helping to reduce the mean time to repair the system.

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THE CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLE PAYLOAD SHIPS

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1982年第2期94卷 179-199页

作者： THOMPSON, DH THORELL, LM Daniel H. Thompson Jr.:is a native of Louisville Kentucky. He graduated from Webb Institute of Naval Architecture in 1957. He was an Engineering Duty Officer in theUNITED STATES NAVYprimarily in the Far East responsible for ship repair and overhaul. He joined Sparkman & Stephens Inc. New York City as Assistant to the Chief Engineer in 1963 and worked on commercial military and private contracts. He has worked for Bath Iron Works since 1967. Between 1967 and 1971 he served first as Project Engineer on the DLG-16 Class Ship Modernization Program which involved eight ships and later as the Assistant to the Production Manager when he assumed the responsibilities for production management administration and sea trial coordination. He organized and directed cost reduction programs and led the development of a comprehensive management administration information system. Between 1971 and 1972 Mr. Thompson served as the Facilities Project Manager responsible for the execution of a nine million dollar shipyard facilities improvement program. In 1972 Mr. Thompson was appointed as the Producibility Assurance Manager for the FFG-7 Program. In this capacity he reviewed the detail design work and coordinated the early activities of the subcontractor responsible for detail design. He was also responsible for the development of the FFG-7 Class Producibility Assurance Manual which provided guidance to the detail designers on production/design integration. During the DG-47 (now CG-47) studies at BIW Mr. Thompson served as the Deputy Program Manager for DG-47 Technical Characterization in 1977. At present Mr. Thompson is working as a Project Engineer in the Technical Department. He is responsible for coordinating the engineering work on new DDGX and Variable Payload Ship projects. On special assignment he is also supporting the Cost Reduction Program at BIW as Chairman of the Technical Committee. Mr. Thompson is a member of SNAME and ASNE and is a licensed professional engineer in New York and Maine. Len Thorell:is a

The decoupling of combat systems from the platform makes it possible for shipyards and combat system suppliers to work in parallel without schedule or technological conflict. Great benefit is derived from building one, standard platform able to accommodate a variety of combat systems. The capability to build and test the payload modules independently, in a well equipped shore-based facility, means higher production efficiency and improved quality control. The standardization of payload-platform interfaces means that the detail design and construction of foundations and distributive systems need not be delayed if some of the combat system components are being upgraded at the time when the ship is in construction. Additionally, shipyards recognize the value of the variable payload ship concept for major combat systems and weapons upgrades. Analysis shows that combat system changes will not lie on the critical path from a scheduling point of view if the payload items are modularized and conform to the Ship systems engineering Standards. The shipyards intend to participate actively in the conservation of tenth-scale models and full-scale mock-ups. These mock-ups should prove valuable in the definition of interface requirements which must be incorporated in the Ship System engineering Standards. The module installation procedures and clearance requirements for both weapons modules and pelletized electronics can be checked in this effective way. Variable payload ship platform construction poses no technical problems as far as new facility requirements are concerned. Shipyards interested in assembling, testing, and installing payload modules would, however, have to use appropriate buildings, equipment, and cranes. These capital requirements are significant but reasonable for those yards that are likely to be interested in building frigates, destroyers, or cruisers. Furthermore, these yards generally plan for production improvements through better facilities, many of which

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THE FFG 7 CLASS DESIGN IMPACT BY INSURV TRIALS

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1982年第2期94卷 87-100页

作者： WOODRUFF, RB The authorgraduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with distinction in 1964. He served initially in theUSS Davis (DD-937)as Main Propulsion Assistant attended the Naval Destroyer School and then was a member of the Pre-Commissioning Crew and Engineer Officer in theUSS Julius A. Furer (DEG-6).Selected as an Engineering Duty Officer (ED) in 1968 he had a tour in the Maintenance Department Staff of Commander Cruisr-Destroyer Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet at Newport R.I. after which he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate studies which culminated in his receiving his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and his degree of Ocean Engineer in 1972. Following graduation he was assigned to the Boston Naval Shipyard followed by two years in theUSS Puget Sound (AD-38)as Repair Officer after which he was ordered to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard as the Production Engineering Officer. Currently he is on duty in the Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 399) where he is the Trials Officer and Hull Technical Director for theOliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)Class Acquisition Program. Cdr. Woodruff is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer and among his military decorations holds the Naval Achievement Medal and the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Citation Gallantry Cross. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1967 he is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute. Two previous papers on Naval Shipyard Production presented at ASNE Day 1978 and 1979 were published in the Naval Engineers Journal Vol. 90 No. 2 (April 1978) and Vol. 91 No. 2 (April 1979). A paper on the Management of Surface Ship Maintenance was published in theNaval Engineers JournalDecember 1980.

This paper describes the impact made on the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class design after numerous trials by the President, Board of Inspection and Survey and his Staff. In the early 1970s, faced with a Fleet of World War II Destroyers, the Navy embarked on a program to build large numbers of Frigates to perform an Ocean Escort role. This ship had three major design constraints placed on it by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO): fixed meaning, fixed displacement, and fixed cost or “designed to cost.” The purpose of this paper is to pass on some “lessons learned.” The acid test of any ship design is how well it does with the Fleet in regard to performance and reliability. How well has the “design-constrained” FFG-7 fared with 20 plus ship trials under its belt? Very well in some areas; not so well in others. Examples of the good aspects of this ship design (LM 2500 and main propulsion train, Standard Option Equipment, et cetera) as well as those which must be considered poor will be addressed. Some examples of the latter are the “breezeway” cargo doors, ship's service diesel generators, MK 92 Combat systems, decontamination stations, and topside corrosion control. In many cases INSURV caused design changes to be made that were sorely needed; in other cases, changes were made (or not made) over issues that had little or no impact on making this ship more ready for war. A brief examination of the Naval Sea systems Command (NAVSEA) surface ship design policies is made from the point of view of the Trials Officer (the Author) who rode most of the trials with PRESINSURV. Some of the issues addressed: •Improved NAVSEA corporate memory between ship designs. •Longer Acceptance Trial for Lead Ship. •Early deployment of Lead Ship without TECHREPS. •Improved NAVSEA/INSURV/CNO communication on Trial/Technical Issues and insertion of INSURV early into the design process. •Need for NAVSEA to stand up and say “no” to costly design changes that do little to make for a better warship.

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MACHINERY ARRANGEMENT DESIGN - A PERSPECTIVE

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1981年第3期93卷 133-141页

作者： RESNER, ME KLOMPARENS, SH LYNCH, JP Mr. Michael E. Resner:received an Engineering Degree from Texas A&M University in 1966 and has done graduate work in management at American University. He is Director Machinery Arrangements/Control Systems and Industrial Facilities Division (SEA 525) at the Naval Sea Systems Command. His previous positions have included Program Manager Solar Total Energy Program at the Department of Energy and Branch Chief Machinery Control Systems Branch at the Naval Ship Engineering Center. Mr. Stephen H. Klomparens:is a Naval Architect at Designers & Planners Inc. and is engaged in development of computer aids for ship design. He received his B.S.E. degree in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from the University of Michigan in 1973 and his M.S. degree in Computer Science from the Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Kolmparens began his professional career at Hydronautics Inc. in 1974 where he was involved in the use of marine laboratory facilities for test and development of conventional and advanced marine craft. Since 1977 he has been involved with naval and commercial ship design and with development of computer-aided ship design tools. Mr. John P. Lynch:is a Principal Marine Engineer with Hydronautics Inc. He was previously employed in the auxiliary machinery and computer-aided design divisions of the David W. Taylor Naval Ship R&D Center the machinery design division of the New York Naval Shipyard and the machinery arrangement code of the Bureau of Ships. His active naval service was as a ship superintendent in the production department of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Mr. Lynch received his B. S. degree in Marine Engineering from the New York State Maritime College and his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from Columbia University. He is a licensed Professional Engineer in the State of New York and a member of ASNE.

The machinery arrangement design process has remained relatively unchanged over the years. Recently, external demands have been placed on both the product and the producers that call for changes to this process. This paper cites these external demands and traces the evolution of the process changes from the rule-of-thumb machinery box sizing routines up to the current automated procedures. The machinery arrangement design practice is presented, and existing analytic and graphics aids are discussed. The user requirements for improved design aids are presented, with implementation guidelines and hardware/software alternatives.

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SESSION NO 1 KEYNOTE ADDRESS - THE CHALLENGE OF DESIGN

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1981年第3期93卷 75-87页

作者： LISANBY, JW was born in Princeton Kentucky on 31 January 1928. He was commissioned Ensign in the U.S. Navy after graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1950 and received his Advanced degree in Naval Engineering (Architecture) from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1956. More recently he received additional training in the Harvard Business School's Management Training Program. He is an Engineering Duty Officer (ED) with wide and varied experience both at sea and in shore assignments. He has had sea duty aboard the USS Mississippi (AG-128) from 1950 to 1952 LST-887 from 1952 to 1953 and USS Antietam (CVS-36) from 1959 to 1961. Ashore he served as Ship Superintendent at the Charleston Naval Shipyard from 1956 to 1959 and as Assistant for Ship Material on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet from 1961 to 1963. In Washington DC he was Assistant for New Construction in the Cruiser and Destroyer Branch Naval Ship Systems Command from 1963 to 1965 and Head of the Procurement and Production Branch Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Project Office from 1965 to 1968. From 1968 to 1969 he was Director of Industrial Engineering in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) and from 1969 to 1970 he served as Executive Assistant to the Commander Naval Ship Systems Command. In 1970 he reported as Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Pascagoula Miss. with contract administration responsibilities for both the DD 963 and the LHA 1 ship acquisitions. Returning to Washington in 1973 he completed a brief tour as Assistant for Ship Design in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and then served as Project Manager for the LHA Class Amphibious Assault Ships with Headquarters in Washington DC from April 1974 until June 1977 at which time he assumed command of the Naval Ship Engineering Center (NA VSEC). With the merger of NA VSEC with its parent command the Naval Sea Systems Command on 1 October 1979 he assumed the duties of Deputy Commander for Ship Design and In

This paper provides a critical analysis of the U.S. Navy's ability to design effective warships relative to the threat we face. Influencing our ability to design are resources, organizational, and philosophical issues. The Russian Fleet is, by any standard, a formidable opponent dedicated to achieving naval superiority. In addition to the well documented differences in design philosophies, there exist fundamental dissimilarities in Russian innovation and their ability to introduce new technologies into an operational environment in comparison to our own conservative, often lengthy, process. We need to reevaluate. In the limit, our collective deteriorating will to design and build effective naval ships is adversely affecting our ability to accomplish the goals we need to achieve. A strengthening of our design resources must be coupled with a reassertion of will and strong technical leadership to revitalize the ship design process.

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THE UNIMAST CONCEPT - A MAJOR DEPARTURE IN SHIPBOARD RADAR ANTENNA INSTALLATION PHILOSOPHY

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1981年第2期93卷 82-89页

作者： BIONDI, RJ KRUGER, BE THE AUTHORS: Mr. Roy J. Biondi:received his B.S.E.E. degree from the University of Illinois and has since taken additional graduate studies at The George Washington University. Currently he is Head of the Ship Type Combat System Integration Branch (Code-6141) Naval Sea Systems Command. Prior to his present appointment he served as Radar Branch Head in the former Naval Ship Engineering Center (NA VSEC) and was responsible for development and production of shipboard radars such as the AN/SPS-48 AN/SPS-49 AN/SPS-52 and AN/SPS-55. His primary Navy Radar and Combat System experience was attained during his earlier career in the Navy's Bureau of Ships where he was the AN/SPS-48 Radar Project Manager as well as the Navy Tactical Data System Data Processing and Display Project Engineer - a total of twenty years of Navy Radar and NTDS experience. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1977 he is a member of IEEE and ASE and has had several technical papers published on Radar Radar Processing and Transmission Lines. Mr. Bradford E. Kruger:is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at ITT Gilfillan Los Angeles Calif. He received his B.S.E.E. and M.S.E.E. degrees from the University of California at Berkeley in 1955 and 1956 respectively and has been with Gilfillan since then. For the past fifteen years he has been involved in the concept formulation and design of numerous radar systems for the Army Navy and Marine Corps. Most recently he has been the Principal Radar Systems Engineer for the SSURADS then the DDGX Program. In addition to ASNE which he joined in June 1980 he is a member of IEEE and holds several patents in Radar and Antenna Technology.

The best topside location for an antenna is on top of the highest mast on the ship, thus affording all-around coverage and minimum interference. However, usually only one antenna can occupy that site. Modern naval combatants have numerous antennas, and the necessary compromises in mounting all of them means that even the best site is often electro-magnetically compromised by adjacent structures and other antennas. A contrary approach is to mount larger antennas lower, and to design the ship to minimize blockage. This is “The UNIMAST Concept,” which argues for a single mast on which are mounted all the ship's major rotating surveillance antennas. The larger antennas rotate around the lower part of the mast, while lighter antennas, e.g., surface search, are sited above. This paper discusses the degradation of sidelobes due to present topside design and numerically relates degradation to Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) performance. Removal of that degradation via the UNIMAST Concept requires that a device known as an Annular Rotary Coupler (ARC) be used. The development of just such a high power, wide-band ARC on a Navy-sponsored R&D contract is herein described. Also described is the potential backfitting of the UNIMAST Concept to existing ships; e.g., the DDG-993. Battle damage vulnerability of the UNIMAST Concept with respect to a conventional two mast design is addressed. It is argued that the UNIMAST Concept affords no degradation in vulnerability due to improved potential for protecting vital antenna parts.

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USE OF COMMERCIAL SPECIFICATIONS IN THE SHIPBUILDING PROCESS

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1981年第1期93卷 77-84页

作者： LISANBY, JW HAAS, J Rear Admiral James W. Lisanby USN: graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1950 at which time he received his B.S. degree and his commission as Ensign. Subseqeuntly he was ordered to Massachusetts Institute of Technology from which he received his advanced degree in Naval Engineering (Architecture) in 1956 and more recently additional training in the Harvard Business School's Management Training Program. An Engineering Duty Officer (ED) he has had wide experience in various assignments both afloat and ashore. From 1950 to 1952 he served in the USS Mississippi (AG-128) from 1952 to 1953 in the USS LST-887 and from 1959 to 1961 in the USS Antietam (CVS-36). Shore duty assignments have included Ship Superintendent at the Charleston Naval Shipyard (1956-59) Ship Material Officer Staff of Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet (1961-63) Assistant for New Con struction in the Cruiser and Destroyer Branch (1963-65) at the former Naval Ship Systems Command (NA VSHIPS) Head of the Procurement and Production Branch Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Project Office (1965-68) Director of Industrial Engineering Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy-Installations and Logistics (1968-69) and Executive Assistant to the Commander NAVSHIPS (1969-70). He then reported as Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Pascagoula Miss. with contract administration responsibilities for both the DD 963 and LHA 1 Class ship acquisitions. Returning to Wash ington in 1973 he completed a brief tour as Assistant for Ship Design in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and then served as Project Manager for the LHA Class of Amphibious Assault Ships (with headquarters in Washington D.C.) from 1974 until June 1977 at which time he assumed command of the former Naval Ship Engineering Center (NA VSEC). With the merger ofNA VSEC on 1 October 1979 with its parent com mand the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) he as sumed his present duties as Deputy Commander for Ship Design and Integration NA VSEA. Rear Admiral Lisanby has been activ

This paper describes the method used by the Navy in the acquisition of ships, with particular reference to the some 2,500 documents referenced directly in the process. For such documents, initially mostly military, a concerted effort is underway to substitute “commercial specifications” where feasible. A comparison is made between the processing of military documents and industry standards. The paper then goes into details of available Industry Documents for materials and small items, noting the general absence for large items of machinery and equipment (and a possible solution). The use of “off-the-shelf” equipment also is discussed as well as advantages and disadvantages of both methods of specifying requirements. Finally, the paper summarizes the alternatives: maximum use of industry standards (either directly or indirectly); use of Commercial Item Descriptions where feasible; and retention of military documents where necessary (mission-critical systems, where marine ruggedness is required, and for truly military applications).

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THE MANAGEMENT OF SURFACE SHIP MAINTENANCE

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NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 1980年第6期92卷 71-83页

作者： WOODRUFF, RB USN THE AUTHORgraduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with distinction in 1964. He served initially in theUSS Davis (DD-937)as Main Propulsion Assistant attended the Naval Destroyer School. and then was a member of the Pre-Commissioning Crew and Engineer Officer in theUSS Julius A. Furer (DEG-6).Selected as an Engineering Duty Officer (ED) in 1968. he had a tour in the Maintenance Department Staff of Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet at Newport. R.I. after which he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate studies which culminated in his receiving his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and his degree of Ocean Engineer in 1972. Following graduation he was assigned to the Boston Naval Shipyard followed by two years in theUSS Puget Sound (AD-38) asRepair Officer after which he was ordered to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard as the Production Engineering Officer. Currently he is on duty in the Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 399) where he is the Trials Officer and Deputy Hull Technical Director for the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class Acquisition Program. Cdr. Woodruff is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer. and among his military decorations holds the Naval Achievement Medal and the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Citation Gallantry Cross. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1967. he is a member of SNAME and the U.S. Naval Institute. and his two previous papers on Naval Shipyard Production presented at ASNE Day 1978 and 1979 were published in theNaval Engineers JournalVol. 90 No. 2 (April 1978) and Vol. 91. No. 2 (April 1979).

The purpose of the paper is to address the current dilemma facing the Surface Ship Navy as it approaches the twenty-first century. The basic underlying thesis is that the Maintenance Community has lost sight of the goal it must have: to support the Commanding Officer of a ship to get his ship from point A to point B with its weapons system ready. To do this, three basic things must occur: 1) the ship must be capable of getting underway and steaming (i.e., turn the screw); 2) the ship must have its weapons systems working and “up” in all respects (i.e., fight the ship); and 3) the Crew must be prepared (i.e., have sufficient training). It Is submitted that we have lost sight of this fact. There remains an inordinate amount of concern over appearance (external and internal), habitability, plaques, inspections, and various human factors programs, and funds may be spent in there areas when the main machinery plant and missile systems are “down.” A recent example is the effort to remove every speck of wood from all Navy ships including picture frames. Training is addressed also as the third key element missing, particularly in the main machinery spaces. A brief examination is made of the ship cycle as it gas into the maintenance mode, i.e., delivery plus one to two years. A comparison is made with the basic Submarine Force approach to this problem and when the Surface Community may take a page out of the Submarine Force book. An addressed are: 1) Current Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP); 2) Planned Maintenance System (PMS); 3) Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection (POT&I); 4) Long lead time SHIPALT material, 5) Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) role (Tenders and SIMAS); and 6) Shipyard role and facilities.

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