作者:
WOODRUFF, RBThe authorgraduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with distinction in 1964. He served initially in theUSS Davis (DD-937)as Main Propulsion Assistant
attended the Naval Destroyer School and then was a member of the Pre-Commissioning Crew and Engineer Officer in theUSS Julius A. Furer (DEG-6).Selected as an Engineering Duty Officer (ED) in 1968 he had a tour in the Maintenance Department Staff of Commander Cruisr-Destroyer Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet at Newport R.I. after which he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate studies which culminated in his receiving his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and his degree of Ocean Engineer in 1972. Following graduation he was assigned to the Boston Naval Shipyard followed by two years in theUSS Puget Sound (AD-38)as Repair Officer after which he was ordered to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard as the Production Engineering Officer. Currently he is on duty in the Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 399) where he is the Trials Officer and Hull Technical Director for theOliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)Class Acquisition Program. Cdr. Woodruff is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer and among his military decorations holds the Naval Achievement Medal and the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Citation Gallantry Cross. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1967 he is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute. Two previous papers on Naval Shipyard Production presented at ASNE Day 1978 and 1979 were published in the Naval Engineers Journal Vol. 90 No. 2 (April 1978) and Vol. 91 No. 2 (April 1979). A paper on the Management of Surface Ship Maintenance was published in theNaval Engineers JournalDecember 1980.
This paper describes the impact made on the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class design after numerous trials by the President, Board of Inspection and Survey and his Staff. In the early 1970s, faced with a Fleet of Worl...
This paper describes the impact made on the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class design after numerous trials by the President, Board of Inspection and Survey and his Staff. In the early 1970s, faced with a Fleet of World War II Destroyers, the Navy embarked on a program to build large numbers of Frigates to perform an Ocean Escort role. This ship had three major design constraints placed on it by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO): fixed meaning, fixed displacement, and fixed cost or “designed to cost.” The purpose of this paper is to pass on some “lessons learned.” The acid test of any ship design is how well it does with the Fleet in regard to performance and reliability. How well has the “design-constrained” FFG-7 fared with 20 plus ship trials under its belt? Very well in some areas; not so well in others. Examples of the good aspects of this ship design (LM 2500 and main propulsion train, Standard Option Equipment, et cetera) as well as those which must be considered poor will be addressed. Some examples of the latter are the “breezeway” cargo doors, ship's service diesel generators, MK 92 Combat systems, decontamination stations, and topside corrosion control. In many cases INSURV caused design changes to be made that were sorely needed; in other cases, changes were made (or not made) over issues that had little or no impact on making this ship more ready for war. A brief examination of the Naval Sea systems Command (NAVSEA) surface ship design policies is made from the point of view of the Trials Officer (the Author) who rode most of the trials with PRESINSURV. Some of the issues addressed: •Improved NAVSEA corporate memory between ship designs. •Longer Acceptance Trial for Lead Ship. •Early deployment of Lead Ship without TECHREPS. •Improved NAVSEA/INSURV/CNO communication on Trial/Technical Issues and insertion of INSURV early into the design process. •Need for NAVSEA to stand up and say “no” to costly design changes that do little to make for a better warship.
作者:
RESNER, MEKLOMPARENS, SHLYNCH, JPMr. Michael E. Resner:received an Engineering Degree from Texas A&M University in 1966 and has done graduate work in management at American University. He is Director
Machinery Arrangements/Control Systems and Industrial Facilities Division (SEA 525) at the Naval Sea Systems Command. His previous positions have included Program Manager Solar Total Energy Program at the Department of Energy and Branch Chief Machinery Control Systems Branch at the Naval Ship Engineering Center. Mr. Stephen H. Klomparens:is a Naval Architect at Designers & Planners
Inc. and is engaged in development of computer aids for ship design. He received his B.S.E. degree in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from the University of Michigan in 1973 and his M.S. degree in Computer Science from the Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Kolmparens began his professional career at Hydronautics Inc. in 1974 where he was involved in the use of marine laboratory facilities for test and development of conventional and advanced marine craft. Since 1977 he has been involved with naval and commercial ship design and with development of computer-aided ship design tools. Mr. John P. Lynch:is a Principal Marine Engineer with Hydronautics
Inc. He was previously employed in the auxiliary machinery and computer-aided design divisions of the David W. Taylor Naval Ship R&D Center the machinery design division of the New York Naval Shipyard and the machinery arrangement code of the Bureau of Ships. His active naval service was as a ship superintendent in the production department of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Mr. Lynch received his B. S. degree in Marine Engineering from the New York State Maritime College and his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from Columbia University. He is a licensed Professional Engineer in the State of New York and a member of ASNE.
The machinery arrangement design process has remained relatively unchanged over the years. Recently, external demands have been placed on both the product and the producers that call for changes to this process. This ...
The machinery arrangement design process has remained relatively unchanged over the years. Recently, external demands have been placed on both the product and the producers that call for changes to this process. This paper cites these external demands and traces the evolution of the process changes from the rule-of-thumb machinery box sizing routines up to the current automated procedures. The machinery arrangement design practice is presented, and existing analytic and graphics aids are discussed. The user requirements for improved design aids are presented, with implementation guidelines and hardware/software alternatives.
作者:
BIONDI, RJKRUGER, BETHE AUTHORS: Mr. Roy J. Biondi:received his B.S.E.E. degree from the University of Illinois and has since taken additional graduate studies at The George Washington University. Currently
he is Head of the Ship Type Combat System Integration Branch (Code-6141) Naval Sea Systems Command. Prior to his present appointment he served as Radar Branch Head in the former Naval Ship Engineering Center (NA VSEC) and was responsible for development and production of shipboard radars such as the AN/SPS-48 AN/SPS-49 AN/SPS-52 and AN/SPS-55. His primary Navy Radar and Combat System experience was attained during his earlier career in the Navy's Bureau of Ships where he was the AN/SPS-48 Radar Project Manager as well as the Navy Tactical Data System Data Processing and Display Project Engineer - a total of twenty years of Navy Radar and NTDS experience. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1977 he is a member of IEEE and ASE and has had several technical papers published on Radar Radar Processing and Transmission Lines. Mr. Bradford E. Kruger:is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at ITT Gilfillan
Los Angeles Calif. He received his B.S.E.E. and M.S.E.E. degrees from the University of California at Berkeley in 1955 and 1956 respectively and has been with Gilfillan since then. For the past fifteen years he has been involved in the concept formulation and design of numerous radar systems for the Army Navy and Marine Corps. Most recently he has been the Principal Radar Systems Engineer for the SSURADS then the DDGX Program. In addition to ASNE which he joined in June 1980 he is a member of IEEE and holds several patents in Radar and Antenna Technology.
The best topside location for an antenna is on top of the highest mast on the ship, thus affording all-around coverage and minimum interference. However, usually only one antenna can occupy that site. Modern naval com...
The best topside location for an antenna is on top of the highest mast on the ship, thus affording all-around coverage and minimum interference. However, usually only one antenna can occupy that site. Modern naval combatants have numerous antennas, and the necessary compromises in mounting all of them means that even the best site is often electro-magnetically compromised by adjacent structures and other antennas. A contrary approach is to mount larger antennas lower, and to design the ship to minimize blockage. This is “The UNIMAST Concept,” which argues for a single mast on which are mounted all the ship's major rotating surveillance antennas. The larger antennas rotate around the lower part of the mast, while lighter antennas, e.g., surface search, are sited above. This paper discusses the degradation of sidelobes due to present topside design and numerically relates degradation to Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) performance. Removal of that degradation via the UNIMAST Concept requires that a device known as an Annular Rotary Coupler (ARC) be used. The development of just such a high power, wide-band ARC on a Navy-sponsored R&D contract is herein described. Also described is the potential backfitting of the UNIMAST Concept to existing ships; e.g., the DDG-993. Battle damage vulnerability of the UNIMAST Concept with respect to a conventional two mast design is addressed. It is argued that the UNIMAST Concept affords no degradation in vulnerability due to improved potential for protecting vital antenna parts.
作者:
WOODRUFF, RBUSNTHE AUTHORgraduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with distinction in 1964. He served initially in theUSS Davis (DD-937)as Main Propulsion Assistant
attended the Naval Destroyer School. and then was a member of the Pre-Commissioning Crew and Engineer Officer in theUSS Julius A. Furer (DEG-6).Selected as an Engineering Duty Officer (ED) in 1968. he had a tour in the Maintenance Department Staff of Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet at Newport. R.I. after which he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate studies which culminated in his receiving his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and his degree of Ocean Engineer in 1972. Following graduation he was assigned to the Boston Naval Shipyard followed by two years in theUSS Puget Sound (AD-38) asRepair Officer after which he was ordered to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard as the Production Engineering Officer. Currently he is on duty in the Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 399) where he is the Trials Officer and Deputy Hull Technical Director for the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG 7) Class Acquisition Program. Cdr. Woodruff is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer. and among his military decorations holds the Naval Achievement Medal and the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Citation Gallantry Cross. In addition to ASNE which he joined in 1967. he is a member of SNAME and the U.S. Naval Institute. and his two previous papers on Naval Shipyard Production presented at ASNE Day 1978 and 1979 were published in theNaval Engineers JournalVol. 90 No. 2 (April 1978) and Vol. 91. No. 2 (April 1979).
The purpose of the paper is to address the current dilemma facing the Surface Ship Navy as it approaches the twenty-first century. The basic underlying thesis is that the Maintenance Community has lost sight of the go...
The purpose of the paper is to address the current dilemma facing the Surface Ship Navy as it approaches the twenty-first century. The basic underlying thesis is that the Maintenance Community has lost sight of the goal it must have: to support the Commanding Officer of a ship to get his ship from point A to point B with its weapons system ready. To do this, three basic things must occur: 1) the ship must be capable of getting underway and steaming (i.e., turn the screw); 2) the ship must have its weapons systems working and “up” in all respects (i.e., fight the ship); and 3) the Crew must be prepared (i.e., have sufficient training). It Is submitted that we have lost sight of this fact. There remains an inordinate amount of concern over appearance (external and internal), habitability, plaques, inspections, and various human factors programs, and funds may be spent in there areas when the main machinery plant and missile systems are “down.” A recent example is the effort to remove every speck of wood from all Navy ships including picture frames. Training is addressed also as the third key element missing, particularly in the main machinery spaces. A brief examination is made of the ship cycle as it gas into the maintenance mode, i.e., delivery plus one to two years. A comparison is made with the basic Submarine Force approach to this problem and when the Surface Community may take a page out of the Submarine Force book. An addressed are: 1) Current Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP); 2) Planned Maintenance System (PMS); 3) Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection (POT&I); 4) Long lead time SHIPALT material, 5) Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) role (Tenders and SIMAS); and 6) Shipyard role and facilities.
作者:
REYNOLDS, MTThe Author graduated from Manhattan College
New York in 1968 at which time he received his BS degree in Electrical Engineering. Later he took graduate studies at The George Washington University in 1973 and received his MS degree in Administration. Following his graduation from Manhattan College he worked for four years in the Anti-Air Warfare Ship Acquisition Project Office of the Naval Ship Systems Command as the Test Program Planning Director for the CGN 36 and CGN 38 Class ships and as the Head of the Combat Control System Integration and Test Branch. In 1972 he was selected to be the Director of Test and Evaluation in the Surface Combatant Ships Project Office (PM-18) in the Naval Material Command. On 1 January 1977 this Office and its functions were transferred to the Naval Sea Systems Command as the Directorate for Surface Combatant Ships. In this Office he has been a prominent figure in developing procedures to implement the “Try-before-Buy” procurement policies in Ship Acquisition Programs. Mr. Reynolds has written one directive for the Chief of Naval Operations two for the Chief of Naval Material and one for the Commander Naval Sea Systems Command on this subject and has also developed a Manual of Standards for Ship Acquisition Managers to use in planning and conducting their Ship Construction Tests and Trials Programs. Since 1974 he has managed NAVSEA's Total Ship Test Program for Ship Production. In addition he has published several technical papers and is a frequent lecturer on Navy Test and Evaluation a certified Instructor at the Navy Acquisition and Logistics Management Training Centerand a member of ASE and ASNE.
In 1970, the Department of Defense issued new policies that revolutionized the management of weapons acquisition programs. As an integral part of the changes that ensued, the function of Test and Evaluation (T&E) ...
In 1970, the Department of Defense issued new policies that revolutionized the management of weapons acquisition programs. As an integral part of the changes that ensued, the function of Test and Evaluation (T&E) came to play a critical role in the weapons acquisition process. T&E results have become a key determinant in the process of program approvals. The Navy had a very difficult challenge to meet in establishing its own policies and procedures to meet the intent of these “try before buy” requirements. It was five yean before the first programs fully structured according to these requirements achieved initial operational capability. It has been, therefore, only within the last three years that our experience base has provided sufficient feedback to allow us to refine our procedures. One lesson learned has been very clear — the new T&E policies have a significant impact on every facet of naval engineering. It is appropriate at this time to assess the results of the new T&E policies and the effectiveness of our practices in implementing them. As could be expected, such a revolutionary change in the way we did business introduced its own inherent problems. This paper traces the T&E policies from the role it played in weapons acquisitions during the 1960s to that of the 1970s. Experience gained to date is used to identify several prime areas where improvements are needed. A “Wish List” of four candidates is presented which, in the view of the Author, offer the most potential for effecting these improvements and maximizing the value of the substantial resources being spent on T&E.
Learning leads to a decrease in program cost and inflation leads to an increase in program cost. At a certain time, the benefits of leaming and the penalty due to inflation will balance each other. This time is define...
作者:
COLEMAN, JAMES J.USNThe author is a graduate of the U.S. Navy Academy
Class of 1957. Prior to pursuing an advanced degree at Webb Institute of Naval Architecture he spent two years in destroyers and four years in submarines. Designated an Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) in 1966 he attended the Deep Sea Diving School and proceeded to Hunters Point Division of the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. Here he was responsible for the production efforts in the Deep Dive System MK 2 and the SEALAB III Program. While at Hunters Point he was also the 12th Naval District Salvage Officer and the Salvage Master during the raising of the nuclear submarine USS Guitarro which sank at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in May 1969. Following a tour on the Staff Commander Service Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet as the Fleet Salvage Officer he assumed command of the Experimental Diving Unit Washington D.C. in 1971 with additional duty at the Naval Ship Systems Command as the Supervisor of Diving. During this tour the Experimental Diving Unit conducted a world record 1600 foot wet hyperbaric dive. Relieved of this command on 1 October 1973 he presently remains as the Supervisor of Diving.
The office of the Supervisor of Diving, Naval Ship systems Command, is responsible for the development and testing of swimmer and diver equipment. The goal of the Navy Diving program is to enable the diver to work saf...
Control and Tracking Techniques for Switched Reluctance Machinesprovides detailed and practical instructions for implementing drive and control techniques for switched reluctance machines (SRMs), which can be immediat...
详细信息
ISBN:
(数字)9783031867279
ISBN:
(纸本)9783031867262;9783031867293
Control and Tracking Techniques for Switched Reluctance Machines
provides detailed and practical instructions for implementing drive and control techniques for switched reluctance machines (SRMs), which can be immediately applied in real-world projects. It presents the latest innovations in control techniques for SRMs, which are essential for the efficiency and sustainability of modern electrical systems. The book includes case studies and practical examples that enhance the understanding of concepts and their application in real scenarios, making the content accessible to both students and experienced professionals. It emphasizes techniques that optimize SRM performance and promote the sustainability of electrical systems, a topic of increasing importance in engineering. With a focus on the current and future needs of the energy sector, this authoritative guide is a key reference for practicing engineers, researchers, and practitioners in the renewable energy industry.
Presents the latest innovations in control techniques for switched reluctance machines;
Emphasizes techniques and innovation with a focus on sustainability;
Offers case studies and a practical approach allowing immediate technology applications in real-world projects.
作者:
LARSON, NORMAN O.DEMYTTENAERE, JULES H.OREM, JOHN B.Commander Norman O. Larson
USN: is an Engineering Duty Officer of the United States Navy who served in the Army as a sergeant of infantry in Europe during World War II. Appointed to the U. S. Naval Academy in 1945 he graduated in June 1949. After two years in the Amphibious Force U. S. Pacific Fleet on board the USS MOUNT McKINLEY (AGC-7) and one year on the USS BREMERTON (CA-130) during the Korean hostilities he attended Webb Institute of Naval Architecture. Receiving his Master of Science in Naval Architecture in 1955 he served two years as an Assistant Planning and Estimating Superintendent for Fitting Out and New Construction at Boston Naval Shipyard and then two years as Assistant Force Maintenance Officer on the staff of Commander Amphibious Force U. S. Pacific Fleet. From 1959–1961 he attended the University of California Berkeley for advanced work in Hydrodynamics. The next two years were spent at the David Taylor Model Basin as Propeller Program Officer. He has been a Project Coordinator in the Hull Design Branch Ship Design Division in the Bureau of Ships since August 1963. Commander J. H. Demyttenaere
U. S. Navy: is an Engineering Duty Officer of the United States Navy and is currently serving as a Project Coordinator in the Hull Design Branch of the Ship Design Division in the Bureau of Ships. He received his B.S. degree in Engineering from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1949. After serving a two year tour on board the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) he was ordered to postgraduate training and received the degree of Naval Engineer from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1954. He has served in numerous Engineering Duty Officer billets since 1954 including two years at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in the Production Department two years of Staff Duty with Commander Service Squadron One three years as Design Project Officer at Supervisor of Shipbuilding New York and most recently as Repair Officer in USS ARCADIA (AD-23). Lieutenant Commander John B. Orem
Jr. USN: is an Engineering Dut
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