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作者机构:Porto Alegre Brazil
出 版 物:《PHILOSOPHIA》
年 卷 期:2014年第42卷第2期
页 面:503-515页
主 题:Justification Cognition Epistemic rationality Cognitive algorithms
摘 要:In this paper, we offer an alternative interpretation for the claim that S is justified in believing that phi . First, we present what seems to be a common way of interpreting this claim: as an attribution of propositional justification. According to this interpretation, being justified is just a matter of having confirming evidence. We present a type of case that does not fit well with the standard concept, where considerations about cognition are made relevant. The concept of cognitive algorithm is presented and explained. Finally, the new reading of S is justified in believing that phi is fleshed out. According to this interpretation, being justified in believing that phi is not just a matter of having evidence in favor of phi, but also of having a cognitive algorithm available such that it allows one to form belief in phi on the basis of the relevant evidence.