CONDITIONALS, PROBABILITY, AND NONTRIVIALITY

作     者：MORGAN, CG MARES, ED 

作者机构：VICTORIA UNIV WELLINGTONDEPT PHILOSOPHYWELLINGTONNEW ZEALAND 

出 版 物：《JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC》 (J Philos Logic)

年 卷 期：1995年第24卷第5期

页      面：455-467页

学科分类：01[哲学] 0101[哲学-哲学] 0701[理学-数学] 

主　　题：Probability functions semiotics Semantics Probability Theses Formal logic Conditional Negation Restriction Conditional probability intuitionism 

摘      要：We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to trivialize the semantics.